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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the Chinese government’s disaster response
over the past two decades, analyze any patterns or recurring management behaviors, and
understand the government’s overall emergency response capability. Disaster response is
one area that reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to govern and exhibit
performance legitimacy. As an authoritarian regime, the CCP relies on repression and
performance to maintain its authority, especially so when national disasters occur. During
times of crisis, the CCP is expected to maintain control and minimize potentially negative
consequences. Not doing so results in a potential image crisis and loss of legitimacy. The
cases studied in this thesis were the 2005 Songhua River benzene spill, the 2008 winter
storms, the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, the 2015 Tianjin warehouse explosions, and the
2016 June and July floods. The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake was the deadliest disaster in
a generation and provides the most thorough example to investigate China’s government
disaster response capabilities. Two of these crises were industrial chemical accidents near
or in major Chinese cities. The remaining two were weather disasters spread over a large
area that required a far-reaching and coordinated government response across multiple
provinces. Each of these sets displays a type of national disaster that China experiences
regularly.
In conclusion, the investigation makes two conclusions about the government’s
disaster response capabilities. First, the central government is able to make extensive use
of its overall authority and hierarchical structure to mobilize state resources on a massive
scale. This includes the CCP’s control of the People’s Liberation Army and state

emergency personnel, the government’s economic authority to impose immediate
regulatory measures, and ability to gather and distribute physical resources. Second, the
CCP seeks to avert an image crisis to maintain a veneer of performance legitimacy. Two
common tactics are repressing investigative journalism and jailing critics while molding
an image of a paternalistic and protecting state through compassionate moral
performance. However, the necessity for this last conclusions hints at why such practices
are necessary in the first place. The CCP’s rush for economic growth, lack of
accountability, and propensity for corruption among other things are the very factors that
have allowed disasters to become crises. Extreme measures are necessitated because the
system the Party has built is prone to crisis. Without fundamental change, the CCP will
continue facing such crises in the foreseeable future.

Table of Contents
Introduction

1

Crisis Framework

4

2008 Wenchuan Earthquake

11

Introduction
Mass Mobilization of State Resources
Compassionate Moral Performance
The State and Civil Society
Weather Disasters – Storms and Floods

50

Introduction
2008 Winter Storms
2016 June and July Floods
Industrial Disasters – Chemical Accidents

71

Introduction
2005 Songhua River Benzene Spill
2015 Tianjin Warehouse Explosions
Conclusion

88

Appendix

101

Bibliography

103

1

Introduction

As the PRC approaches its 68th year in power, almost as long as the 69 years the
USSR lasted from 1922 to 1991, much of the discussion surrounding the PRC’s political
future has been focused on resilient authoritarianism and why the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) did not transition along with the “third wave” of democratization that started
in the 1970s.1 The theory of resilient authoritarianism is the idea that authoritarian
regimes can learn, adapt, and become more resistant to demands for regime transition.
Resilient authoritarianism encompasses the growth and professionalism of state
institutions, which is evident in the context of China. The CCP holds onto power partly
through performance legitimacy and partly through repression. Performance legitimacy
stretches to all realms of the government’s domain, including addressing crises. The
analysis in this thesis looks at the government’s disaster management response through
this lens.
At its core, resilient authoritarianism is the presence of the ability of an
authoritarian regime to stay in power despite the institutional weaknesses presumably
thought inherent within such regimes – including, but not limited to, poor governance,
widespread corruption, and an overuse of coercion. Yet, the CCP’s authoritarian regime
still stands today. Andrew Nathan describes this regime as resilient due to four factors:
presence of norm bound succession politics, increase in meritocratic elite promotion, the

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 5.
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differentiation and functional specialization of regime institutions, and the creation of
methods for political participation within the regime.2 These four factors are the result of
an evolutionary process by which the CCP has developed both formal and informal rules
to regulate cadre behavior and improve the political mechanisms with which the Party
governs. For example, in regards to succession politics Deng Xiaoping passed reforms to
guarantee the personal security of CCP members from harsh retribution and imposed
mandatory retirements on party and government officials to allow the Party to better
reflect the changing nature of the times.3 Reform over how high level Party positions
would be given to CCP cadres led to an increase in stability and performance. Starting in
the 1980s, cadres began being promoted based on successful experience with technical or
challenging jobs.4 As a result, the Party gradually became filled with technocrats who had
valuable experience rather than those solely in the favor of higher officials. The
differentiation and functional specialization of regime institutions also played an
important role and is valuable for the sake of this thesis. The Party apparatus and the state
government apparatus evolved after the 1990s to take on different responsibilities and
prevent inefficient duplication. Those in the Party Center took over “ideology,
mobilization, and propaganda” while those in the government, in particular the State
Council and those in charge of provincial governments, began focusing on more

2. Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1
(February 5, 2003): 6.
3. Minxin Pei, “Is China Democratizing?,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (1998): 70.
4. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” 10.
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administrative tasks such as economic policy, education, and welfare.5 Xinhua reports
that, “The State Council is responsible for carrying out the principles and policies of the
Communist Party of China as well as the regulations and laws adopted by the NPC, and
dealing with such affairs as China's internal politics, diplomacy, national defense,
finance, economy, culture and education.”6 Currently, the State Council and several of its
departments are formally tasked with emergency management. For example, the Ministry
of Transport oversees emergency rescue for railway accidents, the Safety Supervision
Administration standardizes workplace safety measures, and the Bureau of Oceanography
is in charge of researching ways to improve oil spill cleanup.7 In regards to disaster and
crisis management, the ability of institutions to respond to crises is heavily affected by
the clear definition of their responsibilities. The State Council, as a government body, is
able to coordinate and delegate its departments accordingly as needed. This removes
much of the responsibility and pressure from the Party apparatus. Lastly, Nathan lists the
creation of political participation on the local level as a way for the CCP to adjust its
governance and let Chinese citizens participate to an extent that is still manageable for
the Party. Legislation such as the Administrative Litigation Act of 1989 allow citizens to
air their grievances and sue government agencies.8 This option allows citizens to have an

5. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” 12.
6. “The State Council,” accessed April 22, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/english/200508/05/content_20763.htm.
7. “国务院办公厅关于印发国务院 2017 年立法工作计划的通知_政府信息公
开专栏,” accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201703/20/content_5178909.htm.”
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outlet and participate within the system without sacrificing very much of the Party’s
authority. It is these four factors that have allowed the CCP regime to reconsolidate after
the 1989 Tiananmen protests and resist democratization.
In terms of political legitimacy and resilient authoritarianism, disaster
management becomes a stage in which the government’s performance is on display. The
response by the CCP when national disasters occur is vital towards projecting and
protecting the governing regime’s legitimacy. If the regime cannot handle natural
disasters or industrial disasters well, then the government’s image is under attack. A
government that cannot protect the wellbeing of its citizens loses authority. However, the
factors that have contributed to resilient authoritarianism in China have also allowed the
central government to better respond to such situations of crisis, particularly the new
found emphasis on meritocracy and the functionalization of state institutions. The former
brings capable officials into positions of power while the latter delineates responsibilities
to prevent duplication and improve their dexterity when crises occur. Each ministry,
department, or agency is allowed to focus on one area and coordinated by the overarching
State Council. It is this system in which China, for better or worse, has found itself.

Crisis Framework

Crises are the focal point of investigation in this thesis and are mainly defined
based on three criteria: threat, urgency, and uncertainty. In essence, crises are situations

8. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” 15.
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in which there is serious threat to the value or norms of a system, under which time and
uncertain circumstances demand immediate decision making. Arjen Boin identifies that
the presence of these three factors make the situation, turning disorder into crises. The
factor of threat refers to when the basic norms of a system come under attack.9 Threats
strike at the security of basic values such as food, shelter, and safety. Threats define a
political state of crisis, particularly in terms of the government and authority.
Governments are expected, at a bare minimum, to maintain its citizen’s security and
safeguard the national interest. Threats to these two foundational expectations are threats
to the political regime. In China, the Chinese Communist Party is the regime, maintaining
a monopoly over the central and local governments, the military, and foreign affairs.10 Its
claims to legitimacy lie in its ability to govern a country of over 1.3 billion and maintain
stability. In addition, the current CCP leadership under President Xi Jinping takes this
basic responsibility even farther by desiring to carry out the “Chinese dream” of national
rejuvenation and lead the country to becoming a “moderately prosperous society by
2020.”11 These self-made goals not only define the ideological and national political
policy of the CCP’s current administration, but also admit the responsibility the CCP has

9. Arjen Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under
Pressure (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
10. “The Chinese Communist Party,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed
April 20, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinese-communist-party/p29443.
11. “Xinhua Insight: Xi Leads Nation in Pursuing Chinese Dream in New Year Xinhua | English.news.cn,” accessed April 20, 2017,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-02/06/c_136035945.htm.
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towards the Chinese people. Threats toward these goals and responsibilities strike at the
legitimacy of the CCP, which is not held democratically accountable.
Urgency is an important characteristic that turns a threat into a state of crisis.
Threats that are time sensitive and immediate create a perception of crisis.12 An
immediate problem demands an immediate response, which demands rapid decision
making. Crises addressed too late only become worse. In such scenarios, situations and
actors are always changing since time stops for no one. The presence of urgency, whether
perceived or real, turns problems into crises. Its presence signifies that “the threat is here,
it is real, and it must be dealt with as soon as possible.”13 Urgent issues can be a curveball
to politicians and administrators – interrupting plans, forcing changes to policy, and at the
very least demanding their immediate attention. The time crunch also effects mechanisms
of decision-making, rushing the relevant authorities to make decisions they may not be
completely confident with.
The third factor of uncertainty is what delineates a problem from a crisis. Familiar
problems can be faced with similar responses based on past experiences or modelling.
Crises have an element of uncertainty in which the next decision might not be correct or
the problem may not have been identified. Uncertainty is similar to a fog of war, in the
sense that the decision makers do not have complete information during crises and can
act only with what is familiar or available at hand. Yet, they must act all the same. During

12. Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 6.
13. Ibid,. 6.
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times of crisis, “citizens look to their leaders.”14 Due to these three factors, crises are not
simply problems that governments and their institutions must cope with. They pose a
threat to the system and the leadership, and by nature are political. Crises are contests of
power, legitimacy, and friction. In an authoritarian regime such as China, crises are the
state of affairs in which the political system is under threat. Each crisis brings the
question of legitimacy to the forefront as China’s leaders must prove that they can lead. If
not, then trouble begins.
The lack of accountability within the Chinese government compounds the threats
posed by crises. A large enough crisis could threaten the CCP’s hold on power, forcing
the Party into a situation it does not want. The 1989 Tiananmen protests were a prime
example of such a crisis, particularly in this case a political one. Due to the lack of
accountability however, crises, both big and small, pose greater threats to the CCP than
they would in a democratically elected regime. In a liberal democracy, a crisis has the
potential to dethrone the ruling political party or leaders in power. However, there are
usually other politicians or parties that can take their place. In an authoritarian regime
such as China’s however, crises threaten the entire one party regime. A loss of legitimacy
can have a cascading effect, leading to spillover in all areas the CCP is involved in. In a
government without many real channels for citizens to voice their concerns or hold
authorities accountable, citizens release their discontent through protest and loss of faith
in the Party. Failures to address crises lead to a decrease in legitimacy and weaken the
ability of the CCP to maintain power through performance legitimacy.

14. Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 3.
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National disasters and emergencies have the capacity to become crises. The
presence of threat, urgency, and uncertainty create situations in which the CCP must
respond effectively or else it will suffer an image attack. The CCP recognizes this and has
various government organs and legislation dedicated to this purpose. The State Council is
in charge of domestic affairs, including emergency response. The 2007 Emergency
Response Law of the People’s Republic of China states, “For the purposes of this law,
emergencies include natural disasters, calamitous accidents, public health accidents and
public security incidents, which occur abruptly and cause or may potentially cause
serious social harm and for which measures for handling emergencies need to be
adopted.”15 The 2006 National Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan for Sudden
Public Incidents defines such situations as, “An incident that occurs suddenly and causes
or has the potential to cause enormous casualties or fatalities, loss of property, and
environmental or ecological damage; and to pose a severe threat to society or endanger
public security.”16 These incidents have the capability to turn into crises and the
government accordingly has legislation and policies dedicated to addressing this. The
most common emergencies China today faces are natural and industrial disasters. The
presence of norm bound succession politics have so far decreased the probability of
political crises and incidents in recent decades, with the notable exception of Bo Xi Lai

15. “Emergency Response Law of the People’s Republic of China,” Database of
Laws and Regulations, accessed April 21, 2017.
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471589.htm.
16. Catherine Welch, “Civilian Authorities and Contingency Planning in China,”
in the The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, edited by
Andrew Scobell, Arthur S. Ding, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold, 88,
Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 2015.
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and the Falun Gong movement. While pundits suspect that President Xi may decide to
break with tradition and stay in power beyond the informal age limit, up until now the
political process has been bloodless and lacks the distinct retributive and harsh qualities
once found in the Mao era.17 Instead, threats to the CCP’s legitimacy come from other
areas – corruption, foreign affairs, the economy, and disasters. This thesis will focus on
the last category, disasters. Disasters have the potential to become crises, and in doing so
pose a lasting legitimacy test for the CCP. Natural disasters, such as earthquakes, storms,
and floods, are for the most part inevitable while industrial disasters have accompanied
China’s explosive and vastly unregulated economic growth. However, what is not
inevitable is the damage and response to such situations. Even after a period of high
intense growth, China continues to suffer expensive and damaging natural disasters one
after another. Five out of eight of the most expensive non-U.S. weather disasters since
1980 have all occurred in China. Four were floods and one was a drought, each leading to
a significant loss of life.18 As a result, natural disasters pose a potential risk to the CCP
has a cause of crisis, and in certain situations they have been. While not necessarily
posing an existential threat to the Party’s authority, these crises can result in the form of
an image crisis. A failed or faulty response to a crisis results in an attack on the CCP’s

17. Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping, Seeking to Extend Power, May Bend Retirement
Rules,” The New York Times, March 2, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-retirement-rules.html.
18. “Earth’s 5th Costliest Non-U.S. Weather Disaster on Record: China’s $22
Billion Flood | Category 6TM,” accessed April 7, 2017,
https://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=3355.
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image, specifically its image of effective governance and preservation of stability. An
image crisis thus leads to a loss of performance legitimacy. Industrial disasters are very
much the same, reflective of the government’s role, or lack of role, in being able to grow
the economy, provide material benefits for Chinese, and commit to the protection of the
public’s wellbeing at the same time. Crises of an industrial disaster are not necessarily
existential to the CCP’s hold on political authority, but instead cast doubt on the Party’s
ability to be responsible towards the people. In addition, natural and industrial disasters
can shed light on the role of the state in preventing the vulnerabilities associated with
disaster. For example, the shoddy construction of school buildings contributed in large
part to the high death toll of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. This vulnerability was a
direct result of poor governance by local authorities and was not inevitable, though the
earthquake was. The revelation of such shortcomings through such situations can prove
to be a crisis. To be able to address such disasters is a major challenge for the Chinese
government.
The propensity of national disasters becoming crises in China and the ensuing
government response will be investigated through five cases to understand China’s
government disaster management response. The first case is the 2008 Wenchuan
earthquake, through which will be shown the ability of the central government to
massively mobilize resources, respond with compassionate moral performance, and
utilize civil society. The behavior of the central government in response to this
earthquake crisis is illustrative of how the CCP has conducted its response since. The
next four cases are put into pairings due to the similar nature of the disasters. The first
pair are weather-related – the 2008 winter storms and the 2016 June and July floods.
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These two natural disasters were situations in which the central government needed to
conduct a multi-province response over a wide area and were longer in duration than
other disasters, thus testing the ability for the central government to sustain its response.
The next pair are industry-related – the 2005 Songhua River benzene spill and the 2016
Tianjin warehouse explosions. Both disasters were symptomatic of the common
industrial disasters that have been occurring in China since the country began to
economically reform and open up. They highlight the inherent vulnerabilities within a
corrupt economic system with little accountability and regard for public safety. In
addition, they represent a long term threat to the physical wellbeing of the Chinese
people. The long-term response brought about due to both incidents also varied in terms
of follow through and efficacy. This thesis seeks to use these five case studies to examine
how the Chinese government handles disasters, how capable the government is, and how
such crises relate to the legitimacy of the CCP.

2008 Wenchuan Earthquake

Introduction

May 12, 2008 began as a normal day in China. The Beijing Olympics were three
months away and the Olympic torch had just crossed into mainland China a few days
before. But at 2:28 PM the ground started trembling in Sichuan Province as a 7.9
magnitude earthquake shook the earth for over two minutes. The epicenter was only 80
kilometers away from Chengdu, a major city center with a population of 7.6 million.

12

Those affected included over 87,000 people dead or missing, 370,000 injured, and almost
5 million left homeless. The earthquake, with a fault line of 240 kilometers, could be felt
as far away as Shanghai, over 1,700 kilometers away. Tremors were reported across
borders in Pakistan, Vietnam, and Thailand.19 The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake was
China’s deadliest disaster in a generation, but proved to be a pivotal learning point for
how Beijing would handle natural disasters in the 21st century.
Following Boin’s crisis framework of threat, urgency, and uncertainty, the
Sichuan earthquake fulfilled all three criteria. It contained a vast threat to the physical
and mental health of Chinese citizens. The disaster imposed a sense of urgency on both
the government and the Chinese people, and created an atmosphere of uncertainty; no one
knew the level of damage that had occurred or if more tremors would follow. As a result,
from the very first day the earthquake was seen by the CCP as a political crisis of
performance and moral legitimacy. The system maintained by the Party was under
external threat and citizens looked to the state to avert or mitigate it. The government’s
performance would be a legitimacy test and thus, as Boin describes, a political activity.
But good performance was also a moral imperative: the lives of Chinese people were in
danger and needed saving. The Chinese government responded to this dual challenge in
three ways: with the mass mobilization of state resources, through compassionate moral
performance, and the utilization of civil society.

19. “Sichuan 2008: A Disaster on an Immense Scale,” BBC News, May 9, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22398684.
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Mass Mobilization of State Resources

Drawing upon the institutional advantages of a one party authoritarian regime, the
Chinese central government mobilized state and military resources almost immediately.
Two hours after the earthquake occurred, State Council head and Premier Wen Jiabao
flew to Sichuan to oversee the disaster response in an ad hoc committee in Dujiangyan.20
Upon landing, he received a briefing and began organizing the response through the
establishment of the Earthquake Disaster Relief Headquarters of the State Council. The
State Council is the chief administrative authority of the People’s Republic of China and
includes the heads of every governmental department and agency. Since the Wenchuan
Earthquake was classified as a Level 1 “very serious emergency”, the Council and
Premier Wen were entitled under Article 8 of The Law on Public Emergencies Response
to set up an emergency response group.21 Under the State Council’s direction,
departmental institutions then also began coordinating assistance.22 Nine working teams

20. “Premier’s Hands-on Approach an Inspiration,” China Daily, May 18, 2008,
https://web.archive.org/web/20080518072800/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/200805/15/content_6685854.htm.
21. Welch, “Civilian Authorities and Contingency Planning in China,” in the The
People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, 88.
22. Bin Xu, “Consensus Crisis and Civil Society: The Sichuan Earthquake
Response and State–Society Relations,” The China Journal 71 (January 1, 2014): 98,
doi:10.1086/674555.
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were organized respectfully by the Headquarters of the PLA General Staff, the Ministry
of Civil Affairs, the China Earthquake Administration, the Ministry of Health, the
Publicity Department of the CCP, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,
the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Water Resources,
and the Ministry of Public Security.23
In regards to PLA support, the Central Military Commission, China’s highest
military command authority, set up a disaster relief force which included personnel from
the army, air force, armed police corps, public security, fire fighter, and reserve militia.24
Mobilization of military personnel came from both nearby units and farther military
regions. Within two hours of the earthquake, 6,100 People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
troops of the Chengdu Military Region had been mobilized for relief assistance.
Accompanying them was a special earthquake relief team from Yunnan province, which
is in southern China.25 150 members of a field engineer regiment located in the Beijing
Military Region, over 1,600 kilometers away, along with search and rescue teams and

23. Anonymous, “Providing Emergency Response to Sichuan Earthquake,” Text,
Asian Development Bank, (December 31, 2008),
https://www.adb.org/projects/documents/providing-emergency-response-sichuanearthquake-0.
24. James Mulvenon, “The Chinese Military’s Earthquake Response Leadership
Team,” Text, Hoover Institution, (June 17, 2008),
http://www.hoover.org/research/chinese-militarys-earthquake-response-leadership-team.
25. Kamlesh K. Agnihotri, “2008 Sichuan Earthquake and Role of the Chinese
Defence Forces in Disaster Relief,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, accessed
November 28, 2016, 33,
http://www.idsa.in/jds/6_1_2012_2008SichuanEarthquakeand_KKAgnihotri.
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medical personnel from the general hospital of the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF)
were flown to Chengdu. The next day, over 20,000 PLA and PAPF troops had arrived in
the city, 80 kilometers away from the epicenter. Additional support came in the forms of
aircraft, vehicles, and more personnel from the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy.26 Troops
and supplies came in by rail, air, and road. By May 14, over 100,000 PLA troops and
armed police had been sent to Sichuan Province. These personnel were the first
responders to reach many afflicted areas. Two days after the earthquake, 600 PLA troops
were able to reach the epicenter in Wenchuan County and rescue over 1,000 survivors.27
On May 19, Army helicopters were used to rescue 217 students and 14 teachers from
Xingwenping village, which was about 44 kilometers away from the epicenter.28 Also on
the same day, one PLA division searched over 300 villages and evacuated 6,000 people.29
Ultimately, over 148,000 military men, armed police, militia, and reservists would be
involved in disaster rescue for the 2008 earthquake.30
The nature of China’s centralized government as a strict hierarchical one gave it
an important command and control advantage in responding to the 2008 Wenchuan
earthquake. A relief structure was established the day of to coordinate national and local

26. Ibid.
27. “Gov’t Moves Quickly after Disaster,” China Daily, accessed November 27,
2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-05/15/content_6688012.htm.
28. Agnihotri, “2008 Sichuan Earthquake and Role of the Chinese Defence Forces
in Disaster Relief,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 34.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 35.
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efforts. Military orders were given to immediately start mobilizing and assigning
personnel on a country-wide level to engage in relief work. Over 100,000 personnel were
conducting rescue work by the second day since the earthquake. They also made up the
majority of the people involved in relief efforts; repairing roads, setting up camps,
cleaning up debris, and searching for survivors. Beijing brought in help from all over
China, including non-military personnel. The hierarchical political structure meant that
once the earthquake was made a top priority, all of the other state and party institutions
could and were ordered to contribute to disaster relief. The meshing of the party, state,
and security services also allowed this top-down approach to work. Around 66,000
emergency medical rescue professionals were involved in relief efforts. Of them, 30.0
percent were from the seismic area, 56.4 percent were from unaffected areas in Sichuan
Province, 12.6 percent were from outside of Sichuan Province, and 0.5 percent were from
international teams.31
The Chinese government was also instrumental in quickly mobilizing physical
resources. Military personnel used military and civilian aircraft to air drop tons of
supplies to inaccessible areas. Their assistance was instrumental in providing aid
immediately to the stricken areas. The central government organized and dispatched
relief materials such as tents, food, medicine, and fuel. Using its economic authority,
Beijing also commanded big tent factories to work towards maximizing output for

31. Jun Yang et al., “Comparison of Two Large Earthquakes in China: The 2008
Sichuan Wenchuan Earthquake and the 2013 Sichuan Lushan Earthquake,” Natural
Hazards 73, no. 2 (September 1, 2014): 1132, doi:10.1007/s11069-014-1121-8.
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earthquake survivors.32 Local governments partnered with communications companies to
send out emergency information through text messages.33 Government organized nongovernmental organizations took much responsibility to receive supplies and donations.
The central authorities also stepped in to replace and manage local government organs
during the crisis, most of which not only had insufficient information and resources to
deal with the disaster, but also lost much personnel to the earthquake itself. One county,
Beichuan, lost 23 percent of its local officials due to the earthquake. Many were also
injured.34 China was able to bring in skilled and experienced personnel quickly to fill up
these positions. In addition, the government matched affected county with a Chinese
province to provide support for recovery projects under the partner support program.35
The most heavily afflicted county, Wenchuan, was paired with the wealthy Guangdong
province. The partner support program dictated that the provinces would allocate one
percent of local financial revenue towards recovery assistance in their partner counties for
three years. As a one party authoritarian regime, the Chinese government was able to

32. Xu, “Consensus Crisis and Civil Society,” 94.
33. “Open Official Response to Disaster Welcomed,” South China Morning Post,
accessed April 22, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/article/637479/open-official-responsedisaster-welcomed.
34. Ibid.
35. “Report on the 2008 Great Sichuan Earthquake,” International Recovery
Platform, accessed November 28, 2016,
http://www.recoveryplatform.org/resources/publications/199/report_on_the_2008_great_
sichuan_earthquake.
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quickly and comprehensively mobilize personnel and resources on a national scale to
engage in relief effort within hours of the earthquake.

Compassionate Moral Performance

Accompanying Beijing’s disaster management was also a display of moral
performance. Moral performance defined by Xu is “executed through a variety of
impression management methods, including rituals, the public display of political figures’
moral emotions such as guilt, shame and sympathy, and rhetoric and narratives of
policies and governance.”36 In times of crisis, citizens will focus on state actions, but also
on state leaders themselves.37 Moral performance is the presentation that state leaders
exhibit towards and perceived by the public. It frames public discourse and expectations
also. The added dimension of moral performance shows that disaster management is not
purely the mobilization of resources, but also the mobilization of emotions. Moral
performance is used as a way of investigating a state’s cultural governance, which
Elizabeth Perry defines as “the deployment of symbolic resources as an instrument of
political authority.”38 Utilization of symbolic resources can help a state enhance its

36. Bin Xu, “Moral Performance and Cultural Governance in China: The
Compassionate Politics of Disasters,” The China Quarterly 226 (June 2016): 408,
doi:10.1017/S0305741016000370.
37. Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 3.
38. Elizabeth J. Perry, “Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: ‘ReOrienting’ Party Propaganda,” Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series, 2013,
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/11386987, 2.
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actions through a legitimacy or moral crisis. In 2008, that is exactly what the Chinese
state did. The actions of its leaders and the framing of the disaster response narrative
portrayed a compassionate China, willing and determined to shoulder its moral burden of
protecting its people – and maintaining legitimacy.
China’s leadership had a defining role in displaying the moral performance of the
state as compassionate performance. Leadership behavior took on an emotional aspect
that was not seen in previous disaster responses. First, the moral performance of the
leaders were tinged with emotion, particularly sorrow and paternalistic sympathy.39
Beijing even allowed families with an injure child or one who had passed away to be
exempt from the One Child Policy.40 This, combined with the visits of high level political
officials, contributed to a compassionate moral performance by the state. The prime actor
during the response to the Sichuan earthquake was Premier Wen Jiabao. He was in
Sichuan by 7 PM on May 12.41 The speed with which he traveled to the disaster area only
added to his emotional visitations of the afflicted area. He visited the Chinese Medicine
Hospital at Dujiangyan at 10 PM that night. Wen walked around the wreckage and
anxiously asked the rescue personnel, “How many patients were in the building? How
many survivors have been found? Is there hope?”42 At Xinjian Primary School, upon
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hearing that two students were alive, but stuck in the wreckage of a school, Wen called
out in tears towards them. “I am Grandpa Wen Jiabao. You must hold on, child! You will
be saved!”43 His emotional pleas renovated with the Chinese people who were
accustomed to the opposite composure from CCP leaders. Stories also spread about the
personal management Wen displayed to direct rescue efforts. At Deyang City, once Wen
learned that children and workers were stuck in the ruins of a state-owned Dongfang
electric plant, he immediately ordered the China International Search and Rescue Team
to assist them.44 One pro-government newspaper wrote that Wen had tripped while
visiting rescue operations, but had refused medical treatment for his bloody arm,
ostensibly to not divert medical attention and supplies from others in need. Another
account mentioned how Wen yelled on the phone to berate a general when he heard that
PLA troops had not reached Wenchuan City, the epicenter of the earthquake. “I don’t
care what you do. I just want 100,000 people saved. That is my order.” He then slammed
the phone down.45
Wen was not the only CCP leader who personally visited the devastated areas.
President Hu Jintao toured Wenchuan County the Saturday after the earthquake. During
one speech he gave, an aftershock occurred. Hu counselled them, “You should watch out
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and take good care of yourselves too.”46 Most members of the Politburo Standing
Committee, the top leadership committee of the CCP, visited the earthquake stricken
areas. Zhou Yongkang, Li Keqiang, Xi Jinping, He Guoqiang, and Wu Bangguo all
visited Sichuan Province at least once in the two weeks following the earthquake.47 Their
visits, but Wen’s in particular, highlighted a sympathetic and compassionate Chinese
state that was taking the greatest measures to uphold its political and moral duty to ensure
the safety and health of its citizens.
Secondly, the rituals conducted by Chinese political leaders also were displays of
compassionate performance. In times of crisis, the regular completion of rituals are
necessary to present an image of stability and optimism.48 They demonstrate that the state
is prepared to continue governing regardless of threat and particularly in the face of
uncertainty. Rituals seek to transmit this perception of political stability, regardless of the
true feelings of the political leadership. In response to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake,
the CCP conducted several publicized rituals. The first was holding a three-day mourning
period a week after the earthquake had occurred. All national flags were flown at halfstaff, including those at diplomatic missions abroad. Attention was focused on the raising
of the flag at Beijing’s important and symbolic Tiananmen Square, which was flown halfmast at 4:58 AM. Air raid sirens were also set off for three minutes during a moment of
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silence at 2:28 PM that Monday. Public recreational activities were halted during the
three days, as was the Beijing Olympic torch relay. China Central Television even
darkened its screens.49 The Chinese government utilized cultural and emotionally charged
resources to portray a sense of mourning for the victims and sympathy for survivors. This
was a form of cultural governance combined with compassionate performance, showing
that the Chinese state – if not the Chinese nation – was deeply saddened by the lives lost
in the Sichuan earthquake. The national flag and Beijing Olympic torch, representations
of the country and its unparalleled modernization, were displayed with reverence. For
three minutes, the government, the party, and the nation mourned together. President Hu
Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and other Politburo members stood silently dressed in dark
suits in the courtyard of Zhongnanhai, the central headquarters for the CCP and State
Council. A single white paper flower dotted each of their chests, a color associated with
death in China and used predominantly in funerals. This rite was particular because
national mourning periods were only held for those who died for the state, usually
political leaders. These distributed images of the CCP Politburo members standing
silently in mourning were unusually vulnerable and humble, highlighting that the top
officials of the PRC were concerned for the victims of the Wenchuan earthquake. In this
case, it had the effect of binding together the Chinese people and the Chinese state
through a shared motion of remembrance – the country was one. The visits of top
Chinese leaders to the afflicted areas were also a series of rituals that depicted central
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CCP officials walking amongst the rubble with relief personnel and survivors thousands
of miles away from their usual perch in Beijing. The spread of media and articles
depicted the usually solemn leaders emotionally engaged with disaster relief. “Our
premier has been working continuously at the frontline for more than two days. Sadness
is written on our premier's face, but there is also courage, confidence and hope,” says Lu
Ning, a reporter with the Oriental Morning News.50 These rituals and symbolic behaviors
are efforts to preserve the continuation of CCP-led order in China during a moment of
crisis and uncertainty.
Thirdly, the compassionate performance displayed by state leaders also trickled
down to perception of the rescue personnel engaged in relief activity. On May 12, the day
the earthquake struck, China Central Television began showing footage of military troops
and officials immediately responding to the disaster.51 Much of the media that went viral
involved acts of compassion or were emotionally charged. They depicted the relief
workers in a positive light. One popular image was that of a policewoman named Jiang
Xuaojuan who breastfed a baby because her mother was too distressed to do so.52 In a
single picture, Jiang – who was in uniform – and by extension the Chinese state that sent
her, was pictured as both maternalistic and protecting. One Xinhua article depicted the
PLA troops as determined workers when 87-year-old Mao Fengying persuaded Premier
Wen to improve the living conditions of the soldiers with a few words, “Rescue workers
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from the armed forces are really exhausted. They need better living conditions.”53
Military media also helped build PLA and military popularity through various depictions
of troops involved with the disaster response work. Fifty-four-year-old Cui Changun
ignored orders to halt and went into shock due to dehydration while engaged in relief
work. Major General Xu Yong from the Chengdu Military Region led a team that
“moved by land and water, braved being overturned by huge waves or crushed by falling
rocks and collapsing cliffs, taking the lead in advancing on foot to Yingxiu Township at
the epicenter of the earthquake in Wenchuan County.”54 Air Force Political Commissar
General Deng Changyou was another rescue worker to be sympathized with. “Though
over 60 years old, Gen. Deng ignored gravel sent tumbling down by aftershocks and bent
down to shout encouragement to a 20-year-old girl named Jia Zhengjiao who was buried
in the rubble: ‘Child, hang on, you will be all right!’”55 The rescue personnel mobilized
by orders from Beijing were also a display of compassionate performance. They worked
tirelessly day and night, determined to rescue as many survivors as possible. A PLA
statement from their first live news conference of top military officials ever, which was
organized by the State Council, promised that they would take “great efforts into carrying
on the fine tradition of the military in obeying the party’s instructions, serving the people,
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being brave and skillful in battle, making persistent efforts, continuing the fight, being
unafraid of exhaustion, stubbornly fighting with all their might, and being determined to
fight this tough battle of earthquake disaster relief and definitely not fail to live up to the
great expectations of the party and the people.”56 Other statements continued to reinforce
the work and moral performance that the PLA was carrying out under the guidance of the
CCP and Chairman Hu. Their energy was the state’s energy. Their hard work was the
product of government coordination, and their conviction was an extension of Beijing’s
sympathy.
The framing of the disaster response narrative by the state was also an outlet to
display compassionate performance. Many of the accounts of heroism, compassion, and
sadness were formed and spread on state media. The Chinese government acted to
selectively release the information it wanted to and present a compassionate performance
to the public. This manufactured display is not new and was fully utilized during the
aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Two trends during the media coverage of the
disaster response illustrate the compassionate performance spread through state media.
The first was a change in tone, the second a change in emphasis.
First, as documented in the compassionate performance of Premier Wen, was a
change in tone. State media adopted an emotional, sympathetic, and positive tone to
counteract the negative repercussions of the Sichuan disaster and pre-emptively deflect
any blame for the damages caused, something which will receive consideration later.
Wen not only acted in a way that could garner public sympathy, but was also displayed
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by the state media to reinforce their image. Pictures of Wen, other political leaders,
emergency personnel, and survivors were depicted in a profoundly emotional way.
Premier Wen also appeared on live television only a few hours after the earthquake
struck, shouting encouragement.57
Many images of Wen had him embracing children, talking with survivors, or
walking with rescue personnel while the background was filled with rubble or wreckage.
The same pattern was evident in most other images. State media did not shy away from
displaying crying mothers, trapped bodies, or working rescuers, instead they were
presented that way. Previous disaster media coverage hid signs of the dead, the injured,
and the other consequences of disasters, preferring to present smiling images of rescuers
and optimistic politicians. Official coverage of the Sichuan earthquake was different,
displaying the emotional and physical hardship the natural disaster brought to the area –
to China. This presentation invoked emotion and sympathy for the politicians who were
broadcast to the whole nations as deeply concerned about their people. Then there were
the pictures of PLA troops and emergency rescue workers who were engaged in relief
operations, digging with shovels or carrying the injured on their shoulders. Through these
images, the Chinese state became both a caregiver and a protector.
Secondly, the emphasis of the state’s disaster response narrative was also different
from prior disaster coverage. Previously, media coverage of relief efforts for the 1976
Tangshan Earthquake and the 1998 floods centered on the efforts of the rescuers,
particularly the PLA, as heroic and protecting. These narratives depicted the PLA as
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fighting against nature on behalf of the people.58 The media coverage of the Sichuan
earthquake instead touched upon governmental response, recovery efforts, victims,
reconstruction and outside reactions in addition to heroism.59 The Chinese government
emphasized the products of its own leadership in response to the earthquake, but
emphasized it accompanied with portrayal of the severity of the crisis. This emphasis,
combined with the moral performance displayed by the leadership, constructs the identity
of the Chinese government as a sympathetic state. It is not just the heroism of the
rescuers that the government can highlight and praise, but also the magnitude of the
coordination needed to alleviate the consequences of the earthquake and the various
amounts of groups that took part in the relief efforts. Immense management was
necessitated by the sheer impact of the Wenchuan earthquake itself, something that
Beijing could not hide. As a result, state media began introducing articles detailing the
large response the government had to such a far-reaching disaster. Particularizing the
state’s response then provided an opportunity to display the compassionate performance
of the government, its leaders, and the rescuers.
These two trends resulted in the appearance of a narrative of solidarity. The
change in tone showed the Chinese state caring about its people while the strategic
emphasis on the state’s response as something beyond the heroism military troops
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displayed the multifaceted nature of the emergency relief. In essence, the change in tone
made the Chinese state less distant and more human. The emphasis on the various ways
the government responded to the Wenchuan earthquake broke this image down even
further by highlighting that it was Chinese people, whether in the form of PLA troops,
volunteers, or politicians, working through the crisis together. This notion, of
togetherness, initially helped to defuse talk of blame on the part of Chinese officials. In
this narrative, the Chinese people had been struck with an enormous disaster and all
needed to work together, and were working together, to overcome it. The partner support
program that linked damaged counties with provinces was an implementation of the
solidarity narrative. When Chinese in one place suffered, other Chinese throughout the
country should help and support.
Compassionate performance is also integral to image restoration. William L.
Benoit describes image restoration in a corporate context as discourse intended to
understand and develop a response during times of image crisis. Attacks on a
corporation’s image has two effects: “the accused is held responsible for an action” and
“that act is considered offensive”. 60 The danger to corporations when such image attacks
occur is whether the public thinks the corporation is responsible for the negative action.
The accuracy of such responsibility is secondary to its perception. This also applies to the
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action taken, which can be thought to be offensive regardless of whether it is. Expanding
Benoit’s idea to the public sphere is quite straightforward. In China, the government has
an image to uphold. When that image is threated by attacks, the CCP needs to take action
to restore its image. In the Wenchuan earthquake, this meant responding to the damage
the earthquake wrought in Sichuan. While the government was not blamed for the
earthquake, what Beijing could be held accountable for is the emergency response itself.
The perception of a failed or troubled response results in an image crisis. The CCP
needed to do anything it could to avoid this situation. This involves taking responsibility
for a quick and efficient emergency response, but also means preventing the perception
that any of the government’s actions led to a greater disaster than what could be expected.
The framing of the disaster response narrative by the state and the government’s
compassionate performance helped solve the first problem. However, it was not as useful
for the second. The death of thousands of school children due to shoddy school building
construction was an image crisis for the state. It was this image attack that the
government could not deal with well, in part due to the utilization of civil society.

The State and Civil Society

Non-state actors, particularly private citizens, and civil society had an important
role in the response to the Wenchuan disaster, particularly because of technology.
Ordinary Chinese learned about the earthquake from their social networks, mobilized in
massive numbers, donated large sums of money, and volunteered to help with earthquake
relief. Unlike prior disasters, Chinese citizens took it on their own to support the
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earthquake victims and relief efforts. Their assistance proved to be an unforeseen factor
that saw the Chinese government and private citizens working together on a massive
scale for a short while.
The public spirit seemed to arise almost spontaneously once news of the
Wenchuan earthquake began spreading on media. Many Chinese were motivated out of
sympathy for those affected after seeing images or videos of the earthquake’s destruction.
One example of the typical citizen volunteer was Liu Jin. Liu was a 22-year-old student
in Shanghai studying law before he flew more than 2,000 kilometers to Sichuan. He
described being motivated after seeing the earthquake’s aftermath. USA Today quoted
him saying, “[his parents] thought the government and military could handle the
disaster,” but he disagreed and flew to volunteer.61 Liu was not alone, private volunteers
manned relief stations and provided everything from psychological counseling to electric
power for cellphones.62 Others with medical training went to the earthquake area to give
whatever medical assistance they could. Liu Qiang, a 38-year-old from Hubei province,
described “seeing people crying on TV because they couldn’t get medical help” as her
rational for volunteering.63 More volunteers drove convoys of aid to Sichuan, helped at
emergency shelters, and “millions” lined up to donate blood immediately after the
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earthquake.64 Prominent private citizens also contributed. Many athletes and celebrities
donated towards earthquake relief charities. Olympic gold medalist Liu Xiang and his
coach donated a total of $71,500 to charity.65 Official charities became overwhelmed by
the amount of donations. The Sichuan Provincial Red Cross received over 2 billion yuan,
but only had 17 staff members to do so.66 Many also donated to private charities due to
mistrust of the government, fears of embezzlement, and concerns over a lack of
transparency. One Foundation, a charity founded by celebrity Jet Li, received over 25
million yuan the day after the earthquake struck.67 Why though was this public effort able
to take place? Most disasters until this time had been handled solely by the Chinese
government. As Liu noted, it was common for Chinese to place the burden of emergency
response on the Party. However, the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake allowed for such
heightened state-civil relations because it was a consensus crisis.
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A consensus crisis is a specific situation in which there is widespread agreement
on the nature of the crisis and the approach that should be taken to address it.68 In the
case of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, this meant the general acknowledgement of the
danger that the earthquake brought and the need to bring critical aid to those in need. The
external threat that the earthquake represented brought everyone to the same page. The
actors in this situation were the Chinese government, civil society, private citizens, and to
a minor extent international and foreign aid groups. The earthquake devastation was
visible and pressing enough to unite all of these groups together to achieve the same goal:
assisting those in need. The Chinese central government took almost immediate action to
address the crisis. Premier Wen flew to Sichuan two hours after the earthquake had struck
and began coordinating a response. More than 6,000 PLA troops began moving to assist
with disaster relief and by the second day there were over 100,000 personnel in the area.
However, this seemed to not be enough and civil society stepped in to fill the gap. Civil
society and private individuals were primarily motivated by two factors. First was
endogenous, citizens saw images of devastation on the news or videos of relief efforts
and were moved to help. These were volunteers such as the Liu Jin and Liu Xiang
mentioned earlier. The second factor was different, provincial authorities actually
appealed for private citizens to volunteer and to help. The Sichuan government
communicated that they needed donations and relief services.69 And volunteers came.
The State Council eventually ordered the local Sichuan governments accommodate
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public representatives to jointly manage relief materials and donations for the earthquake
relief.70 The Council also tried to make donation efforts and the use of funds more
transparent by making the names of those officials in charge of distribution public. In
addition, the enthusiasm of the public was quite strong and contributed to high civil
society turn out. The mood among volunteers was quite patriotic and energetic. Some
volunteers delivered crates of water bottles while chanting “Go China!”71 After the
designated three minutes of silence held on the Monday after the earthquake struck, many
of the gathered demonstrators spontaneously raised their fists in the air and shouted,
“Come on China!”72 These three factors had a significant contribution to the efforts of
civil society to support emergency response efforts.
There were two other contextual dynamics that allowed civil society to take a
larger than usual role: the unfettered access media was given initially to report on the
Wenchuan quake and the desire for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to use the
state of consensus crisis to their advantage. In regards to the first dynamic, the Chinese
government unusually allowed domestic and foreign journalists and non-state media
permission to report on the earthquake.
Social and informal media were the first to start posting images and videos of the
disaster online. The first report of the earthquake was actually on Twitter, which was not
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blocked in China at the time, around nine minutes after the quake occurred and ahead of
the U.S. Geological Survey by three.73 Videos of students and office workers in the
streets also began appearing on YouTube, which was also not blocked at the time.74
Netizens also posted updates and questions onto online message boards, such as
Douban.75 Chinese used these internet forums and social media networks such as Twitter
to begin coordinating volunteering, donations, and parsing through information about
people’s loved ones.76 Initially, journalists defied state orders to enter the disaster area,
but the government remarkably reversed its initial prohibition. Hundreds of journalists
immediately went to Sichuan following the initial news of the earthquake to deliver live
coverage of the disaster response to media outlets around the country.77
Foreign media was also allowed unfettered access in the aftermath of the earthquake,
which was a stark contrast from the Tibetan riots in March that year when foreign media
was completely banned from reporting from the Tibetan Autonomous Region.78
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According to China Daily, “at least 545 overseas reporters from 144 media organizations
in 30 countries” reported from Sichuan right after the earthquake.79 In an unprecedented
moment, Deputy Director of the State Council Information Office Wang Guoqing and
President Hu actually thanked foreign media for risking their personal safety to report
from the quake disaster zones.80 The Chinese government had an incentive to allow
foreign media access to the quake zone however. They did not want to repeat the spate of
foreign media coverage that followed the Tibetan riots in March, which was particularly
bad timing for the CCP who did not want bad coverage a mere five months before the
2008 Beijing Olympics. Foreign media coverage of the Tibetan riots was completely
negative in part to foreign media outlets primarily relying on Tibetan exiles for
information, which was biased against the PRC.81 Another benefit to the Chinese
government for allowing foreign media into Sichuan province was the opportunity to use
the press as good coverage. Denying the press access also meant denying the CCP any
chance to latch onto positive reporting of the government’s emergency response. Instead,
the positive reporting that did occur thanks to foreign media gaining access was used by
the CCP to promote the narrative that the crisis was under control. For example, Premier
Wen utilized this opportunity to hold an impromptu press conference with foreign
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reporters, a very rare event for foreign media.82 In fact, foreign media also propagated the
narrative that the Chinese government was being open to honest reporting. According to
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, the New York Times, Wall Street
Journal, Associated Press, and Los Angeles Times noted the open access Beijing gave to
foreign journalists.83 Such access would eventually become restricted, for both domestic
and foreign news, but the CCP successfully used the good coverage to build a positive
image for itself.
The initially lax restrictions on the media also spilled over to policies for NGO
involvement. NGOs played a more expansive role in responding to the Sichuan
earthquake then they ever had in any previous situation. The position of NGOs within
Chinese society before the earthquake was one of social service, rather than social
advocacy.84 Government repression and suppression of NGOs and social efforts to
advocate for social, and inevitably political, ideas had forced Chinese NGOs to adapt.
Those that continued on the path of social advocacy found themselves dismantled and
repressed. NGOs that focused on social service were less likely to run into trouble with
the authorities and thus made up the majority of NGOs in China. Their lack of political or
even socio-political goals made them safe from the Chinese government. As a result,
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NGOs were ready to perform the volunteering and assistance role that the earthquake
situation demanded. NGOs began responding immediately. According to data from
Beijing Normal University, “73.2 per cent of the 60 NGOs that they investigated took
action within 24 hours after the earthquake.”85 Domestic NGOs also formed networks
and partnerships to better respond to the crisis. According to Shawn Shieh, Chinese
NGOs began organizing horizontally through different sectors on their own.86 Chinese
civil society started taking independent action because NGOs felt that now was the time
they could participate and utilize their social service-oriented characteristics. There were
six NGO symposiums in the first month after the earthquake that met to discuss how
NGOs could assist with the disaster relief in their own way, thereby differentiating
themselves from the government.87 A reason for this emphasis may have been that NGOs
wanted to prove to Beijing that not only were they able to stay out of sensitive political
issues, but also that their presence was a necessity. Until the crisis subsided, government
officials temporarily walked back on their hostility to NGOs and private organizations
working specifically towards supporting relief efforts.88 The serious threat of the disaster
and the lack of capacity on the part of the state created this situation.
As a result, NGOs were able to funnel and expand the public spirit and the
volunteer atmosphere that had swept the nation towards disaster relief. The NGO
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networks that Shieh mentions began to form with massive support and energy almost
immediately. The day after the earthquake, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation,
China Foundation for Youth Development, and other NGOs jointly drafted and published
a “Declaration on China’s NGOs for Earthquake Disaster Relief.”89 Notable is the
primary role of private foundations that together generated this declaration. The amount
of private foundations began to rise after the Beijing passed Foundation Regulation laws
detailing the roles of these specific NGOs in 2004.90 One distinct characteristic of private
foundations is their inability to raise funds publicly and are only able to do so through
private channels. However, in a historic first, government-organized NGOs distributed
funds for NGOs assisting with the disaster response. The Chinese Red Cross allocated 20
million RMB towards NGO projects, including Global Village, an environmental NGO
that assisted with village rebuilding.91 Private foundations were also able to distribute
money to NGOs. For example, the Nandu Foundation gave monetary donations to over
60 grass-roots NGOs focusing on reconstruction.92 The NGOs decidedly assisted with
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apolitical affairs such as providing relief services, goods, and monetary donations.93
Organizations also self-censored themselves during this process, mainly restricting
themselves to doing social service work and no social advocacy work. One NGO told its
workers not to “get involved in conflicts with the community,” and another directed its
efforts specifically to opening libraries, taking care of children, and teaching people how
to knit.94 As such, NGOs were able to play a wider role in responding to the national
disaster, but were limited by what kind of spaces they could take up and what services
they could provide. In total, more than one million volunteers helped with relief
measures, thanks in part to the efforts of NGOs.95
However, all good things eventually come to an end. The same was true for the
unfettered access the media had in Sichuan and for the level of independent action NGOs
worked with. Optimistic op-eds and blog posts about the open future of civil society and
media in China quickly lost steam as the Chinese government reverted to its usual
censorship and restrictions on civil society. Beijing began clamping down on independent
media reporting at least six weeks after the earthquake struck in May because more
coverage, particularly foreign media coverage, began focusing on the shoddy
construction of the multiple school buildings that collapsed.96 Restrictions on the media,
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particularly foreign media, began when news reports about protests and criticism over the
school buildings started occurring. The Chinese government clamped down on both
domestic and foreign media, began restricting the disaster zones, and started arresting
critics in what ended up being a return to repression. But first the CCP worked to stifle
protests and local critics.
Chinese citizens in Sichuan, particularly parents, started criticizing the
government once they realized that the school buildings their children had attended were
not built up to earthquake-proof standards. At least 6,500 children and their teachers died
on May 12 in their school rooms.97 At least 7,000 school buildings collapsed due to the
earthquake.98 Protests began less than a month after the earthquake struck and were
forcibly stopped by the police. On June 3, a large group of parents went to Dujiangyan
City’s People’s Court to file a lawsuit apparently against the headmaster of the city’s
Juyuan Middle School, which had killed hundreds of children after collapsing during the
quake.99 Police officers prevented them from filing the documents and stopped the
proceedings. Later that day, BBC attempted to visit the court but over 100 officers
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blocked the way. This occurred all over Sichuan, with reports of parents being detained,
physically hurt, or pressured by police officers and officials.100 The Chinese government
also began sealing off damaged and collapsed school buildings, which were often being
turned into makeshift memorials for grieving parents. For examples, parents placed
wreaths and banners calling for justice around the Xinjian Primary School. Police came
and took both away, only to end up returning the wreaths but not the banners after
widespread outcry.101 Parents of over 100 students who had lost their lives marched in the
streets of Mianzhu City and were approached by a local official who knelt in front of
them and plead for them to stop the march.102 Other government officials attempted to
pressure protestors to accept monetary government settlements and compensation.103 One
banner set up in the memorial for the children who died at Fuxin No. 2 Primary School
said, “While we cannot stop a natural disaster, human errors are the most hated.”104 Many
parents held resentment and bitterness towards the local officials and those they believed
to be complicity in letting construction companies bypass earthquake-safety regulations.
In face of such criticism, the Chinese government quickly shifted gears and went back to
restricting media and repressing protests.
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The central government took notice and began instructing CCP organs, media,
and security services to take control of the narrative and work towards preserving order
and stability. In June, Politburo Standing Committee member and Secretary of the
Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the CCP Zhou Yongkang visited
Sichuan Province and urged security forces to “maintain social stability” before the one
month anniversary of the earthquake.105 Government efforts to preempt criticism and
perpetuate a positive, pro-government narrative took three forms: changing the media
narrative, restricting foreign media, and arresting critics.
In line with Zhou’s directive, officials began restricting the national conversation.
Online, forums and web discussion groups were scrubbed clean of any criticism
surrounding the collapsed school buildings. Critical posts were deleted.106 The CCP
began directly exerting pressure to stop reporting on sensitive issues. Articles and news
media that contained criticism of the school buildings disaster were themselves subject to
criticism by state organs and state media. New China News Agency, a state media group,
directly accused the Southern Weekend paper for using “tinted glasses to view China”
after the latter published commentary linking the high death toll of students to the poor
construction of school buildings.107 The Ministry of Education (MOE) also began
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pushing a “heroic teacher” narratives by highlighting the accomplishments of teachers
who put their students first and brought them to safety. For example, MOE officials spent
a news conference praising teachers and students for acting heroically.108 The MOE then
pledged to start a national study campaign to teach students around the country about the
hero teachers and students. Beijing also attempted to show that justice was being served
by firing officials for the magnitude of the earthquake’s destruction. One department
official reported that the 43 officials had been reprimanded and at least 12 of them fired
due to “dereliction of duty and misuse of earthquake relief.”109 In an effort to show that
the emergency response operation would not be inhibited by corruption, the State Council
introduced transparency measures in regards to public donations by instructing local
government officials to make sure, “the names of the people in charge of the distribution
should be made known to the public as well as their contact numbers. [Local
governments] should invite a number of people's representatives to help oversee and
manage the distribution of relief materials.”110 There also seems to be some efforts by the
CCP to quickly and efficiently respond to allegations of corruption. One blogger in late
May reported that wealthy Sichuan residents were using their connections to
misappropriate tents for their own use. In response, the government launched an
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immediate investigation.111 All of these efforts were carried out to show that the
government was being responsible in how it was responding to the earthquake. The
central government also tried to preempt criticism by focusing on measures the CCP was
taking to avoid such disasters in the future. For example, the Xinhua published an article
a year after the earthquake struck titled, “After fatal lesson, China build stronger school
in quake zone.”112 It contained positive government efforts such as the passing of an
amendment to the “Law on Precautions against Earthquake and Relief Disaster,”
requiring that schools be built to withstand 8.0 Richter scale earthquakes. This
amendment was attributed by the article to Premier Wen. The article also noted how the
Red Cross Society of China “published guidebooks for students, telling them how to
survive disasters,” which Xinhua said were beginning to be used starting April 2.113 The
State Council also added a clause directly linked to the Wenchuan earthquake in their
2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan of China for the “guarantee of human
rights in the reconstruction of areas hit by the devastating earthquake in Wenchuan,
Sichuan Province.”114 In this way, the government sought to control the narrative and use
domestic media to paint a positive picture.
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Beijing also clamped down on the access foreign media had to the earthquake
disaster zones and attempted to restrict foreign media from communication with
protestors. Early signs of media limits began to appear in early June, just as protests were
starting to gain steam and concern the central government. On Thursday, June 12, six
foreign media journalists, including one from BBC, were prevented by security officers
from covering parents protesting at Dujiangyan primary school. Even though one official
remarked that it was, “not censorship” it clearly was.115 Almost a year later, the Chinese
government was still not allowing foreign journalists to cover the aftermath of the quake.
According to the Foreign Correspondent’s Club of China, the government was becoming
increasingly active in regards to stopping the reporting of sensitive issues and there were
at least three instances were French and German reporters were hindered by security
officials from covering the school building collapse scandal.116 A German television crew
was even detained for five hours while the father they attempted to meet was hustled
away by police, despite the National Human Rights Action Plan clause. These tactics
were reminiscent of usual efforts by Beijing to reign in negative media coverage.
In addition, the Chinese government specifically targeted critics. At least four
Chinese citizens were arrested for attempting to investigate or even compile information
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related to the school building collapse scandal. They were Huang Qi, Zeng Hongling, Liu
Shakun, and Tan Zuoren.117 Beyond harassing parents and preventing them from holding
government officials accountable, the authorities also took efforts to stop those who were
actively trying to gather more information about such a sensitive issue. The government
was suspected of obfuscating the actual death toll of students killed and Chinese courts
have not accepted any lawsuits related to the collapse of school buildings. Resistance to
independent investigation has also been high. Well known critic and artist Ai Weiwei
attempted to find out what the real number of students lost was, but was harassed by the
authorities.118 His blog was shut down and over 50 of his volunteers were temporarily
detained.119 Huang Qi is a “veteran dissident” and was arrested on June 10 on the basis of
“possessing state secrets”, less than a month after the Wenchuan earthquake actually
occurred.120 He was held without charges beyond the legal limit of 37 days without
access to legal counsel.121 Zeng Hongling is a retired university professor who was
arrested in May 2008 on the account of “subversion,” most likely due to publishing three
essays of her experiences after the earthquake.122 Liu Shakun was a teacher and convicted
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in August of “disseminating rumors and disrupting social order” when he posted images
of collapsed schools online.123 Tan Zuoren was also arrested in March 2009 on the
account of “subversion” after he tried to create a list of the names of students who lost
their lives due to the collapsed schools.124 Each of the four arrested had very similar
charges, all related together as crimes against the state. The charges seem to have been
given out because the accused were a danger to the official narrative that Beijing was
creating. The results of each case varied however. On November 23, 2009, Huang was
sentenced to three years in prison. His appeal was denied in February 2010.125 Zeng was
most likely let go in September 2008, but not too much information is known about
her.126 Liu was sentenced to a labor camp, but was permitted to leave in September 2008
and spend the rest of his one year sentence outside of custody.127 Tan’s case had the most
attention out of the four. Over 500 friends and supporters attempted to attend Tan’s trial
in Chengdu, but were prevented by about 100 police officers. They were not allowed in
on the basis that they did not possess the required pass, although they were told earlier
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that no such requirement was necessary.128 One of those that attempted to support Tan
was Ai Weiwei, he was intercepted before the trial occurred and was punched by police,
which left him with cerebral hemorrhaging.129 The Chengdu Intermediate Court gave a
verdict in a very short hearing of less than five minutes. His wife was prevented from
entering the courthouse to hear the verdict.130 Part of the evidence supporting the charges
against him included speaking to foreign journalists about the earthquake. Tan ultimately
was sentenced to five years in prison and “an additional three years deprivation of
political rights” due to his efforts to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen
Square crackdown.131 Tan attempted to appeal his sentence in June 2010 but was rejected
in another very short hearing – one that lasted less than 12 minutes. He was released in
2014 after his full five-year term ended.132 The repression of critics harmed the positive
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image the Chinese government had labored to build after the earthquake struck. However,
the targeting did seem to stop mass criticism of authorities and was part of the effort to
prevent the CCP from being held accountable by outside forces. Along with censorship in
the media and restriction on foreign journalists, the targeting of critics over the school
collapse scandal proved that the relaxed position the Chinese government took towards
the media was over about a month after the May 12 earthquake.
NGOs also faced a restriction on what their activities. As mentioned earlier,
NGOs preempted government action by self-censoring themselves and purposefully
keeping to apolitical services. After Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou
Yongkang urged local officials and the security services to maintain stability, local
authorities began imposing tighter restrictions on NGOs and monitored them more
closely. It was widely reported that volunteers were required to show their identification
and told to register with the local governments. Those associated with religious
organizations were scrutinized even more closely, some being told not to stay overnight
in disaster zones.133 High profile cases of private foundations, such as Jet Li’s One
Foundation, gaining legal status as public foundations seemed to be an opportunity for
private groups to receive government recognition. However, the full benefits of such a
process and position were thrown into question due to cases of provincial governments
directly interfering and managing donations given to public funds. One example was the
Qinghai provincial government, who took over donations collected by public funds and
was seen as the “death of charity” in China.134 Needless to say, such behavior did not sit
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well with NGOs and private foundations. The participation of NGOs in disaster
management seemed to have reached a high-water mark with the response with the 2008
Wenchuan earthquake. No later crises or disasters seem to have had any level of NGO
engagement with disaster response as displayed in 2008.
The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake was the biggest natural disaster in a generation
for China. With over 87,000 dead and more than 5 million left homeless, the Chinese
Communist Party needed to address the disaster and prevent a crisis from becoming even
worse than it already was. If the Party was not able to handle the aftermath well, then the
earthquake would be a serious blow to its reputation and image. As such, the disaster
response was from the very beginning a political performance. Beijing needed to
coordinate over a million volunteers and personnel, connect ruined villages with the
proper relief, and finance the massive reconstruction to come. In addition, an energetic
public with watchful eyes clamored to help. 2008 was a pivotal moment for China and for
a Party whose success was so closely linked to its performance.

Weather Disasters - Storms and Floods

Introduction:

The Chinese New Year, also known as the Spring Festival, is the largest Chinese
cultural event of the year. Celebrating the turn of the traditional Chinese calendar, the
Spring Festival is preceded by what is considered to be “the largest annual human
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migration in the world” as millions of Chinese people working or studying in the coastal
regions return home for celebrations. This mass migration, named Chunyun or the Spring
Festival travel season, usually takes place two weeks before the Lunar New Year and
lasts for 40 days. In 2008, Lunar New Year’s Day took place on Thursday, February 7.
But one month before the festival started, a series of winter storms gathered in southern
and central China on January 10. By January 21, the snowstorms had spread to nine
provinces, blanketing highways and disrupting power lines. The first emergency response
team was sent by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) to assist with disaster relief in
Huanggang, a major municipality in Hubei province and central China. The situation in
Huangguang was designated as demanding a Level 4 emergency response, the highest
level according to the “National Natural Disaster Emergency Response Plan.” Hubei
province was designated Level 3. By January 23 however, Anhui province was
designated as Level 4 and Guizhou province Level 3. The scope of the snow storms
started to exceed expectations. Disaster relief was beginning to be carried out in Hunan
province and the snowstorms had now impacted ten provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities. On January 28, the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) issued a
red alert – the most severe – for central and eastern China, forecasting heavy snow in
Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangsu province. By the time the
snowstorms subsided in mid-February, more than 78 million people and 14 provinces,
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autonomous regions, and municipalities had been affected. An additional 129 lost their
lives in China’s “worst snowy weather in more than half a century.”135
Disasters are not always limited to simply one geographic location. The 2008
winter storms and the 2016 June and July floods show that weather disasters can create
the conditions in which a widespread multi-provincial response is needed. In these cases,
the central government must take control of emergency response efforts lest provincial
authorities struggle on their own to protect their citizens. Such weather disasters also
require a great deal of proactive measures to prevent them from becoming crises. Early
warning system and even informational government statements can go a long way
towards preventing disasters from occurring. The 2008 winter storms exhibited what a
central government-led response looks like, particularly in regards to coordination of
emergency response efforts. In addition, it occurred the year of the Beijing Olympics so
the government needed to make sure that it was seen as capable of protecting its own
people. The 2016 June and July floods were the first large-scale disaster test for the Xi-Li
administration. Floods have been an informal standard of effective and responsive
governance. Both storms and floods are China’s most frequent weather-related disasters,
respectively in that order.136 If the central government cannot mitigate the consequences
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of these weather effects, than its claim to legitimacy as a protector of the Chinese people
is under question.

2008 Winter Storms

Based on the data available, the 2008 winter storms can be divided into three
periods. The first encompasses the beginning of the weather crisis until January 23, when
the MCA responded with statements to the national snow crisis and the “Hunan snow
disaster.”137 It was then that the scope of the potential for disaster was finally beginning
to be understood. The next segment lasts until Premier Wen Jiabao arrives in Changsha to
begin personally overseeing disaster relief efforts.138 Until January 29, the State Council
in Beijing was unable to send any high-level officials over to the disaster areas due to
transportation problems caused by snow storms. Provincial governments and ministries
tried to coordinate relief efforts by themselves. After January 29, the central government
was able to project a perception of control as the crisis subsided, sending President Hu
Jintao and other PSC members into relief areas. The PLA also mobilized to join relief
efforts that day. This period is marked by Premier Wen’s China National Radio address
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in Hunan, when he told the country, “We have the faith, courage and ability to overcome
the severe natural disaster.”139
The first sign of an incoming weather crisis occurred in early January. A MCA
report recorded abnormal weather due to the mixing of hot and warm air across central
and eastern China on January 10. Several provinces and regions, including Xinjiang,
Inner Mongolia, Henan, Hubei, Anhui, Hunan, Guizhou, and Shaanxi experienced rain or
snow storms. The nine provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities that initially
were effected by heavy snow were Anhui, Henan, Hunan, Hubei, Chongqing, Sichuan,
Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang.140 Xinhua reported that heavy snow had damaged crops
in Anhui province, a poor and mainly agricultural province in eastern China on January
12. Snow blanketed and damaged 215,000 acres of crops.141 Provinces such as Shaanxi,
Hubei, Anhui, and Guizhou had never seen this much rain or snow in the past 20 years.
As a result, the provincial governments and even the CMA were caught off guard.142 The
Chinese Ministry of Education (ME) then issued a statement on Monday, January 21 to
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allow schools to adjust their winter holiday times due to the worsening winter weather.
MOE cautioned schools to prevent bus overloading and enforce safe traffic rules. Six
deaths were blamed on snowstorm-related causes, including four in Hubei and Anhui
province.143
By January 23, the snow storms had affected almost 25 million people. The MCA
released a report detailing the scope of the damage caused by the snow disaster. Over
150,000 people had to be relocated, mostly from Hubei and Hunan province. Twenty
thousand homes collapsed and another 80,000 suffered damages. In addition, the storms
affected agriculture in these provinces and around 1 million hectares if crops were
damaged. 144 As of this point, direct economic losses contributable to the storms were 31
billion yuan.145 The MCA stated that they were coordinating with the CMA and local
civil affairs departments to coordinate a response. In addition, they confirmed that they
had sent a working group to the Huangguang municipality disaster area in Hubei after
designating the situation there a Level 4 emergency, thus requiring a national response.
January 23 was only 15 days away from Lunar New Year’s day, and the storms kept
going. On January 24, the MCA published a statement responding and detailing
emergency relief efforts in Hunan province. The storms had now affected 32 million
people in 10 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities: Anhui, Henan, Hunan,
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Hubei, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang. Anhui province
was designated as a Level 4 emergency and Guizhou province Level 3. The hardest hit
areas continued to be Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, and then Guizhou. More houses had
collapsed or been damaged, more people were forced to relocate, and economic losses
were now calculated to be 62 billion yuan.146
The national government response to the winter storms decisively gathered
momentum when Premier Wen Jiabao ordered relief measures at an emergency
teleconference of senior Chinese officials on Sunday, January 27.147 Wen gave energy
conservation instructions to restrict national energy usage and divert power to needed
areas in the storm-afflicted regions. The Premier than attempted to fly straight to Hunan
province but was diverted to neighboring Hubei province due to the weather on Monday
night. Also on January 28, the PLA’s Department of General Staff and the General
Political Department issued a joint decree mobilizing troops to participate with relief
efforts in storm-afflicted areas. They described troop relief efforts as an “anti-snow
battle.” By Tuesday, 158,000 PLA troops and Chinese People’s Armed Police and
303,000 paramilitary members were assisting with relief work. 148 The next morning –
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Tuesday, January 29 – Wen finally reached his destination of Changsha City, Hunan’s
capital, by train.149 This marked the third period of the winter storm crisis and the
perception that the central government was now in full control of the relief situation. On
that day, three events occurred that demonstrated this perception. First, the Central
Politburo, chaired by President Hu Jintao, held a meeting to decide on its emergency
response and released a statement to the public, describing the crisis as the “most
pressing task”.150 In essence, the Central Politburo outlined the response priorities:
“ensure electricity supply and smooth communications and transport by every possible
means.”151 Second, the MCA and Ministry of Finance also allocated $13.5 million to aid
four areas affected by the storm, on top of another $17.4 million already distributed to the
disaster-hit provinces Anhui, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Hunan, Hubei, and Guangxi. Echoing the
guidelines set by the Central Politburo, the MCA sent out instructions to local civil affairs
agencies to help those stranded outside in train stations or highways.152 Lastly, Wen’s
behavior in Changsha represented to the Chinese public that the central leadership was
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concerned and actively seeking to improve their wellbeing. Wen met with local state
departments to direct relief efforts. He also visited the Changsha railway station, where
he apologized to the stranded passengers. “I am deeply apologetic that you are stranded
in the railway station and not able to go home earlier. We are now doing our best to fix
things up and you will all be home for the Spring Festival.” One more gesture of
sympathy was when Wen visited the families of three electricians who had died cleaning
a transmission tower the previous weekend. He apologized to them and bowed. “As I face
you here today, I cannot find enough words to express my condolence. Please accept a
bow from me.”153 The state response after January 29 marked a more active and
government-directed approach to the winter storms crisis, despite bad weather continuing
for almost two more weeks. Local governments worked to lower or subsidize rising food
prices. The central government focused on sustaining energy production and attempted to
increase domestic coal shipping.154 In addition, the government had to deal with
thousands of travelers stranded on their way home for the Spring Festival.155 The PLA
also played its part, airlifting supplies and carrying out numerous relief efforts with the
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mobilization of 300,000 troops and almost 1.1 million reservists.156 The winter storms
continued for roughly another two weeks to a varying extent in 21 provinces, autonomous
regions, and municipalities. From January 11 to February 14, the average national
temperature was “minus 2 degrees Celsius (28.4 degrees Fahrenheit), 0.3 degrees below
normal and a record low for the past two decades.”157
The 2008 winter storms posed a great and distinct challenge for the Chinese
government. Unlike most natural and manmade disasters, the 2008 winter storms took
place across a large swath of southern, central, and eastern China, thereby requiring
multiple provincial responses since there was no epicenter. Threat, urgency, and
uncertainty are the criteria in this paper for crises and the 2008 winter storms fulfilled all
three. Adding to these three factors was the timing of the winter storms, taking place right
before Chunyun and the start of the Spring Festival. The transportation demands of
Chunyun exacerbated the problem by placing an enormous strain on infrastructure right
when the winter storms were happening. The threat of storm-caused deaths, economic
breakdown, and mass social discontent weighed heavily on the minds of the Politburo.
The situation needed to be handled quickly due to the desire of the more than 170 million
Chinese who wanted to return home for festival celebrations, compounded by an urgent
need to restore running water, electricity, and food supply to many isolated cities. It was
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uncertain if, how, and when the Chinese government could overcome this task. But the
Party did. The roads were cleared, power was restored, and food delivered.

2016 June and July Floods

In China, floods has been a persistent test of the government’s ability to secure
the safety of their citizens.158 These common natural disasters have been so common and
intertwined with Chinese history that they were even embedded within ancient Chinese
folklore. Prominent sinologist Derk Bodde wrote, “Of all the mythological themes of
ancient China, the earliest and by far the most pervasive is that of the flood.”159 More
recently in the Middle Kingdom, from 1990 – 2014, floods were the second most
frequent natural disaster after storms, were second in terms of mortality due to disasters,
and caused the most economic issues.160 Four of the most expensive non-U.S. weather
disasters since 1980 were floods in China according to the International Disaster
Database, each with a significant loss of life.161 As a result, the almost annual flooding
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that China experiences poses a recurring natural disaster problem for the Chinese
Communist Party. Floods have had the most impact in terms of the number of people
affected and the economic damage suffered. The consequences of natural disasters have
been noted by the Chinese government. In March 2016, the Ministry of Civil Affairs
reported that, “Natural disasters left about 1,500 people dead or missing annually from
2011 to 2015,” affecting over 300 million lives annually – 9 million of whom have been
displaced.162 Responding to these disasters is a necessity, and the Chinese people depend
upon and expect the government to do so; by providing the warning, services, and
assistance needed to guarantee their safety when floods do occur.
The June and July floods in 2016 were picked as a case for this thesis for several
reasons: timing and magnitude. In regards to timing, it was the first large flood to occur
after Xi Jinping was elected General Secretary of the CCP in 2012 and President of the
PRC in 2013. The floods can be viewed as one of the first large domestic crises that the
Xi-Li administration faced. Their reaction was indicative of how well they could handle
disasters and utilize China’s emergency response system. The magnitude of the June and
July floods, in regards to the people affected, the scale of the response, and the economic
cost to recover, raised the stakes of Xi-Li’s performance. The floods affected southern,
eastern, and northern China. Over the course of two months, over 32 million people in 26
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities.163 The dual factors of timing and
magnitude also amplify each other, increasing the pressure on the Xi-Li administration
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and the political capital at stake. In essence, handling natural disasters properly,
particularly floods, is a clear sign that the government is in control. Authority over the
environment is a particular historical facet of Chinese governance, the CCP’s emphasis of
the benefit of projects such as the Three Gorges Dam to control flooding along the
Yangtze River is not an accident. In 1938, the Nationalist government did the opposite by
deliberately breaching the Yellow River dikes in an effort to prevent or impede the
Imperialist Japanese Army advance in Henan province.164 A poor performance when
flooding occurs can poison public opinion, impede political reform, and reduce the
political capital available for the Xi-Li administration. In addition, the perception of
disaster relief mismanagement is a danger for key actors in the state and party
hierarchies. As will be seen in the case of the June and July floods, if higher authorities
feel negative pressure from public opinion over disaster negligence, they are not hesitant
to blame and suspend lower state government officials.165 Social media plays a key factor
in disseminating positive or negative information over state performance. The June and
July floods display that the stakes are high whenever massive flooding occurs in China.
As a result, the 2016 June and July floods do conform to the crisis framework – of
threat, urgency, and uncertainty – posited earlier in this thesis. There was a dual threat
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involved due to the flooding. First were the millions of lives at risk considering that the
flooding would impact one tenth of China’s total land area.166 Second were the political
stakes involved. Not only was this the first big flooding of the Xi-Li administration, but
the floods would test how well, if at all, the government was prepared to handle natural
disasters. The MCA itself admitted that over 1,500 people have lost their lives to natural
disaster every year since 2011.167 The 2016 floods also imbued urgency and uncertainty.
Unlike past earthquakes or typhoons that China has experienced, flooding can occur
intermittently and over the course of a few weeks and is not a single event crisis. In
essence, floods have more staying power and cannot be cleaned up as easily, they isolate
small villages and cut off transportation between cities. Authorities needed to respond to
floods as soon as they appeared, and as they repeatedly appear, or else the loss of life
would increase drastically. The uncertainty in this case was also twofold. First on the
local level was whether authorities could accurately predict flooding and act against it.
The inability to do so led to harsh consequences, as thing in Xingtai.168 Second was the
ability of the Xi-Li administration to perform well and handle the widespread flooding.
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Unlike other case studies examined in this thesis, the 2016 June and July floods
were a prolonged weather disaster that contained crises. Unlike the 2008 winter storms,
there is not a distinct turning point when the trajectory of the crisis clearly shifted.
Rather, the changing tempo of the rain that caused the flooding led to a dynamic timeline
of provincial efforts and central government attention. The amount of articles on state
media regarding the 2016 June and July floods is rather incomplete. This is may be
partially due to the extensive length and sporadic nature of the flooding crisis. Most state
media articles regarding the floods were published in July.
The first signs of a rainy summer began when the State Flood Control and
Drought Relief Headquarters (SFCDRHQ) reported that China was entering its flood
season 11 days earlier than usual on March 21.169 Two months later, the National
Meteorological Center (NMC) issued a blue alert for heavy rain in Southern China on
May 21.170 A blue alert is the lowest level in the NMC’s four-tier warning system. By
May 25, heavy rain during the week forced more than 27,000 people to evacuate in
central China’s Hunan province, and more than 1,800 houses were destroyed by storms.
The SFCDRHQ warned that the Yangtze, Songhuajiang, Huaihe, and Pearl rivers were in
danger of overflowing and causing major flooding.171 The Yangtze River basin contains
one third of China’s total population, many of the regions and people affected by the June
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and July floods lived in this area.172 Four days later, rain triggered a landslide in eastern
China’s Zhejiang province as the China Meteorological Authority (CMA) continued to
warn of continuing rain.173 In early June, the central government launched the first flood
control emergency response of the year after acknowledging that heavy rain was expected
in Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guandong provinces and the Guangxi
region – or roughly one tenth of China’s total area.174 Most of this 1 million square
kilometer area was in central and southern China. About half of the region was expected
to receive “super torrential rains” that increase the risk of flooding, resulting in a blue
alert status. According to state media, blue alerts “involves 24-hour alerts, daily damage
reports and dispatching money and relief materials within 48 hours.”175 A state media
article on June 20 began listing statistics related to the torrential flooding. There had been
22 deaths, 197,000 displaced, and about 3.7 million people affected by the flooding,
particularly in Hubei, Sichuan, and Chongqing.176 The amount of economic damage was
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placed at roughly $400 million. Four days later, the central government began sending
high ranking government officials, including State Councilor Yang Jing, to the afflicted
areas. State Councilor Yang is the Secretary General of the State Council and subordinate
to Premier Li but above the level of state department Ministers.177 The duties of the State
Council include emergency response.178 State Councilor Yang visited Jiangsu province,
where 98 people had died and 850 had been injured due to the weather conditions, which
included hail, tornadoes, and torrential rain.179
By late June, the worsening weather conditions impacted transportation and travel
services in several southern provinces and Chongqing municipality. Sichuang, Guizhou,
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Anhui were hit by storms for days. Train services,
the backbone of China’s cross-provincial transportation system, were disrupted.
Highways were flooded and thousands had to evacuate their homes. The Hubei provincial
government issued flood alarms due to the potential flooding danger of more than 780
full reservoirs.180 On June 30, the NMC stated that the situation in southern China now
warranted a yellow alert, the second-lowest level in the NMC’s four-tier system.181 The
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next day, the NMC moved the alert level to orange, the second-highest warning level, due
to a forecast of heavy storms in Anhui, Jiangsu, Hunan, and Guizhou provinces. The
Tibet Autonomous Region also suffered heavy rains. Since June 27, an additional 14
people had died, 20 were missing, 120,000 had been displaced, 3,600 homes had
collapsed, and the direct economic cost was over $470 million.182
Besides flooding, the heavy rain impacted environmental conditions in other
ways. The rain contributed to landslides, such as one in Guizhou province that caused 23
deaths in Dafang County.183 Torrential rains also burst levees and led the overflowing of
river banks. In addition, floods affected rail lines and bridges, including 27 flooded
railway sections and a collapsed expressway in Hunan Province. Many travelers were
stranded on their way to destinations or were unable to move between major cities.
Transportation from China’s larger cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Xi’an, Urumqi,
Kunming, and Guangzhou, to the southern provinces was halted.184 Another effect was
groundwater contamination, one gas station in Yiyang City leaked 3 tons of gasoline and
diesel oil.185 The damage to the agriculture was also immersive. Many of these poorer
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provinces contain heavy concentrations of the agriculture industry. In Anhui Province
alone, the heaving flooding “killed some 7,100 hogs, 215 bulls, and 5.14 million fowl.”186
Almost 1.7 million hectares of crops were destroyed.187
The central government began taking a more visible approach in their response to
the widespread flooding. On July 5 and 6, Premier Li went on a 30-hour tour of Anhui,
Hunan, and Hubei provinces to visit local authorities, support relief efforts, and
encourage the populace.188 Premier Li said that the country should “prepare for an
arduous campaign” and heartened Chinese to be prepared for more flooding in the weeks
ahead. He was accompanied by Vice Premier Wang Yang and the previously mentioned
State Councilor Yang Jing.189 Since June 30, 128 people had died and 42 were
unaccounted for.190 Super Typhoon Nepartak started making landfall in early July also,
compounding the flooding problems from a very rainy season. Several rainfall records
were made, Wuhan’s meteorological office reported that more rain had fallen in the past
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week than any seven-day period since 1991.191 President Xi also called on the PLA and
PAP to increase relief efforts.192 The number of PLA troops used for the emergency
response is not completely known, but over 32,000 PAP were working to fight the
flooding by July 9. Their responsibilities included evacuating people, reinforcing flood
barriers, and transporting supplies.193 On July 6, state news media reported over 186
people had lost their lives and the floods had affected 26 provinces, municipalities, and
autonomous regions.194 However, eight days later on July 14, SFCDRHQ stated that 237
people had died with another 93 missing. The statistics were very grim for the June and
July floods by this time, almost two months since the floods began. In addition to the
victims of the flooding, more than 147,000 houses were destroyed and 5.46 million
hectares of crops flooded. Fortunately, the water levels of the Yangtze River, where much
of the flooding had occurred, finally began dropping during around this time according to
the SFCDRHQ.195 Flooding also occurred in northern China around Beijing Municipality
and Hebei Province during the latter half of July, where the CMA issued an orange
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alert.196 One county in Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei Province, received more rain in
48 hours than it did the entire previous year. Around 25 people unfortunately lost their
lives in this last round of flooding.197
The 2016 June and July floods were a protracted crisis that proved to be difficult
for the Chinese government to handle. The scope of the heavy rains impacted a vast
geographic area of China’s territory and affected the lives of millions of Chinese.
Multiple provinces received multiple bad weather conditions several times. The floods
were also China’s second costliest weather-related disaster in history and Earth's fifth
most expensive non-U.S. weather-related disaster ever recorded according to the
International Disaster database with a cost of $22 billion.198 As with other disasters, the
Chinese people looked towards the government for assistance. The protracted length of
the floods meant that the emergency response could not be finished quickly or at once.
Unlike debris or snow, water is cannot be cleaned up and is only so malleable. The nature
of flood relief necessitates a different and long-term approach. For the Xi-Li
administration, the June and July floods were a testing ground for the inevitable disasters
to come.
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Storms and floods test the ability of the central government to coordinate
provincial bodies on a national level. Such widespread disasters affect millions when they
occur, costing the country billions in economic damage. While nature cannot be changed,
at least not yet, what can be is the government’s ability to limit the potential damage
inflicted. Both the 2008 winter storms and the 2016 floods proved the need for an
immediate, coherent, and present response.

Industrial Disasters – Chemical Accidents

Introduction

On the quiet night of August 12 at 11:20 PM, two explosions erupted in the port
city of Tianjin. Flames and smoke quickly filled the night sky, illuminating the city.199
Resident caught the first explosion on video on their smartphones, wondering what had
happened. But the second explosion that followed seconds later was even more
frightening, beginning with a bright burst of light that completely enveloped the first
explosion. The successive blasts caused fires, broke glass panes, and covered the
surrounding area with ash and debris. According to the China Earthquake Administration,
the first explosion was recorded as a 2.3 on the Richter scale and produced shockwaves
equal to three tons of TNT going off. The later explosion registered a 2.9 on the Richter
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scale and was equal to the detonation of 21 tons of TNT.200 Residents of Tianjin felt as if
an earthquake had struck or a nuclear weapon had gone off. One remarked that, “The
impact alone woke me and my sister up last night, we were so scared. We hid under our
blankets and were wondering if it was an earthquake or atomic bomb.”201 The second
detonation was felt over 160 kilometers away by US Geological Survey equipment in
Beijing.202 A Japanese Meteorological Agency satellite was even able to capture the
explosion on camera from space.203 By midnight firefighters rushed to the scene,
desperately trying to contain the blazes and toxic fumes from spreading from the port to
the other parts of the city. The official investigation of the blasts later found that a dry
container of nitrocellulose, a highly flammable compound, had ignited in one of Tianjin’s
numerous chemical warehouses.
This chapter focuses on industrial disasters, another set of crises that the Chinese
government worries about, despite the regulations set in place to prevent them from
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happening. They occur regularly, though the damage extends to varying degrees. In the
one year time period after the 2015 Tianjin warehouse explosions, there were at least ten
other chemical-related industrial disasters in China that led to 12 people losing their lives
and over 40 injured.204 The spate of industrial disasters in the last few decades are one of
the side effects of China’s expansive economic growth. As the country’s chemical
industry continues to grow towards a predicted 40 percent share of the global chemicals
market, particularly as it shifts towards producing more specialty chemicals, the danger
of industrial disasters also increases.205 The expanding Chinese middle class will also
take a greater interest in health and environmental concerns, two fears that have only
been compounded by the industrial disasters that have happened and continue to
happen.206
The pair of cases that will be investigated are the 2005 Songhua River benzene
spill and the 2015 Tianjin warehouse explosions. Both were high profile cases that
highlighted the ever present threat of industrial disasters and the potential for them to
become crises. Particularly in the benzene spill case, what could have been a common
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industrial chemical leak instead led a city of 4 million people into a panic and heavily
increased distrust in the government. These two case studies show how the important
factor of local government politics and corruption can tip disasters over the brink into
much more costly crises.

2005 Songhua River Benzene Spill

Benzene is a colorless chemical used as a solvent and cleaning agent. Exposure to
benzene causes degeneration of bone marrow, leukemia, and a loss of white blood
cells.207 On November 13, 2005, roughly 100 tons of this hazardous chemical leaked into
the Songhua River after explosions at a petrochemical plant owned by China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).208 Eleven days later, the 100 tons had become an 80kilometer long slick of benzene and reached Harbin’s water supply and urban river areas
on November 24.209 Harbin, a city of 4 million, partially depends on the Songhua River
for its running water. The Chinese authorities did not publicly release information about
the vast slick of toxic chemicals until the day before, November 23.210 It was estimated
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that the benzene would reach the Sino-Russian border in two weeks.211 Industrial
chemical accidents similar to the benzene spill in the Songhua River are common in
China. Another explosion on November 23 at the Yingte Chemical Company prompted
fears of another benzene spill around Chongqing and led to 6,000 people being
evacuated.212 Schools were closed and residents told not drink nearby river water.213 The
2005 Songhua River benzene spill is notable due to the time lag between the explosion at
the CNPC plant and when authorities finally notified the public about the risk of water
contamination. This gap received much criticism from the public and state media, which
also blamed the CNPC for the accident. The river spill taught the CCP how not to
respond to such a time sensitive disaster.
The 2005 Songhua Rive benzene spill fulfills the three conditions of crises. The
threat of the chemical spillage was clear to the authorities, who tried to cover it up and
prevent the benzene from concentrating within the Songhua River, which they failed to
do. A comprehensive response was needed since the benzene quickly began moving
downriver towards Harbin, one of northern China’s biggest cities, and eventually towards
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the border with Russia. Over 4 million citizens were at risk from the benzene and at risk
of dehydration if replacement water was not found. Uncertainty was also a factor,
considering the withholding of the magnitude of the explosions from the general public
and from the various authorities. The initial response by the Harbin government hid
information and the danger of the spill from the public and contributed to panic within
the city.
Explosions rippled through Jilin Province in northeastern China from 1:45 to 3
PM on Sunday, November 13.214 The chemical plant was operated by the Jilin Petroleum
and Chemical Company, which was owned by the CNPC. The blast shockwaves broke
glass windows up to 200 meters away. Over 10,000 nearby residents were forced to
evacuate to officials due to “fear of further explosions and pollution by chemical matters,
which produces benzene.”215 State media did not mention any possibility of benzene
leaking into the Songhua River on November 13. The explosions, which were caused by
improper handling procedures at one of the towers that held benzene, also led to some
fires which were put out by 4 AM Monday. Authorities reported that almost 70 people
were injured, but that no toxic gas had polluted the air quality. A general branch manager
of CNPC stated to the press, “We will take lessons from this accident to improve safety
facilities in production.”216 Two high ranking officials of Jilin Province visited the
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disaster site to coordinate the response the day after the explosions – Jilin Provincial
Committee Party Chief Wang Yukun and Jilin Governor Wang Ming.217 Classes at the
Jilin Chemical Industrial College and one other nearby college resumed Monday after
students and faculty were evacuated due to the blasts.218 State media reported the cause of
the accident, but still made no mention of the slick of benzene heading down the Songhua
River. The public was in the dark about the lethal danger posed from drinking river
water.
The State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA), a national level
agency, confirmed Wednesday, November 23 that dangerous amounts of benzene and
nitrobenzene had contaminated the Songhua River.219 The hazardous 80 kilometer slick
of benzene reached Harbin’s water supplies the next morning. The media blackout about
the true nature of the chemical plant explosions prior to the SEPAs confirmation added to
the panic and misinformation. The CNPC plant was located in Jilin Province, but the
Songhua River traverses through Heilongjiang Province, where Harbin is located.
Originally, Jilin provincial officials kept the spill to themselves, telling those in

216. “Death Toll Rises to 5 in Chemical Plant Blasts,” China Daily, accessed
April 15, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/200511/14/content_494543.htm.
217. “One Dead, 5 Missing in Chemical Plant Blasts,” China Daily, accessed
April 15, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/200511/14/content_494329.htm.
218. “Cause of Jilin Chemical Plant Blasts Found,” China Daily, accessed April
15, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-11/15/content_494601.htm.
219. “Chemical Plant Blast Contaminates River,” China Daily, accessed April 16,
2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-11/24/content_497472.htm.

78

Heilongjiang that there had been no leak. However, it seems that because the Jilin
provincial officials could not contain the hazardous slick, even attempting to dilute the
concentrated benzene with reservoir water, they notified the Heilongjiang authorities on
November 19.220 Pressed for time, on November 21, the Harbin government announced
that they would shut off and conduct maintenance work on the city’s water supply
system.221 This surprise announcement raised considerable suspicion and fear in Harbin
and within the media. A rumor started spreading that the government feared an
earthquake or that there was an industrial spill. The earthquake rumor was thoroughly
denied by the Harbin government, but because of the level of hysteria the authorities
admitted that a chemical spill had occurred.222 The public was very mistrustful of and
angry at the government, resulting in Harbin officials releasing hourly updates after
admitting that a benzene sill had occurred.223 Ironically, the panic that government
officials wanted to avoid still happened because the authorities did not give the public
enough time to prepare for the incoming slick of hazardous chemicals and instead
allowed misleading and panic-inducing rumors to circulate.
The SEPA then held a press conference in Beijing, led by deputy director Zhang
Lijun, to release more statistical information and laid the blame for the industrial disaster

220. Jim Yardley, “China Tried to Keep Benzene Spill Secret,” The New York
Times, November 25, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/25/world/asia/china-triedto-keep-benzene-spill-secret.html.
221. Ibid.
222. Ibid.
223. “China warns Russia of toxic slick.”

79

solely on the CNPC.224 Once the truth was out, the populace realized that the government
was going to shut down the water supply to preempt hazardous contamination rather than
because of maintenance led to panic. The Harbin populace began to buy as much fresh
water or purchase transportation to leave the city. Supermarkets and other stores quickly
ran out of water while residents also bought containers to store fresh water while they
could. Water prices also went up drastically to take advantage of the panic buying. One
resident quoted by BBC describes how, “The city was full of ridiculously large queues.
People were buying water in massive quantities.”225 The Harbin government then finally
shut off the city’s water supply for almost five days and made efforts to calm the
populace. Public officials claimed to have transported over 16,000 tons of bottled water
into the city from neighboring areas, including 10 trains of water containers from
Shenyang.226 The Harbin government also allowed the city a brief moment to connect to
the city’s water supply for 15 hours.227 In addition, authorities sought to build more wells
to bring drinkable groundwater into the city and make sure that the existing wells were
working.228 Harbin had 918 wells at the time of the crisis, with the government building
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another 100.229 All of Harbin’s schools were closed and hospitals were put on standby for
potential benzene contamination cases, but there ended up being no fatalities of river
contamination in the city.230 As with other natural disasters, the government also set up
funds to assist the emergency response. Over $1 million was put aside for general relief
efforts and another $120,000 given to the elderly and poor.231 The Harbin government
tried to placate and calm the populace, which did seem to have some positive affect on
the population.
The danger did not end at Harbin however, despite the benzene concentration
naturally diluting as it flowed downriver. The Songhua River cuts through half of
Heilongjiang Province before merging into the Heilongjiang River on the northeastern
Sino-Russian border. According to state officials, most of the cities and towns downriver
from Harbin relied on groundwater for 90 percent of their fresh water.232 The benzene
slick finally entered Russian waters on December 16.233 Communication over the
benzene chemical spill with Russia was initially dogged with miscommunication, with
the Russian authorities at one point saying they had not been informed properly or
quickly in time. Officials were reported saying that China had, “dragged its feet in
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communicating about the potential health hazard.”234 However, Beijing promised to work
closely with Moscow and its counterpart emergency agencies. China sent Russia eight
pieces of water testing equipment and more than 1,150 tons of activated carbon to help
manage the chemical hazard.235
The disaster also had political ramifications. The State Council assigned Li
Yizhong, director of the National Bureau of Production Safety Supervision
Administration, to head an investigation of the benzene spill in December 2005. He
vowed that, “Anyone, who were found guilty of dereliction of duty, will be harshly dealt
with.”236 Premier Wen Jiabao also sent out a statement ordering the relevant
environmental departments to improve on water monitoring systems and water supply
security. The State Council then pledged to drastically improve environmental policy and
regulations to fight against environmental degradation by 2020.237 Chinese authorities
had cracked down on over 2,600 polluting plants from May 2004 to September 2005, but
pledged to continue to do so.238 Ultimately, the local manager of the CNPC Jilin plant
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and head of the SEPA resigned after the crisis passed.239 The vice mayor of Jilin
committed suicide days before a hearing on the benzene disaster in 2006.240 The Chinese
government did take some decisive actions afterwards as well. Over $600 million was
earmarked towards improving Harbin’s water supply and quality. Beijing also added the
Songhua River to a list of bodies of water requiring extra environmental protection.241
The organization of the SEPA was also eventually changed, being reorganized into the
Ministry of Environmental Protection, thus giving the reformed SEPA greater power as a
central government ministry, rather than just an agency.242
Industrial related disasters still happened, though rarely on such a large scale as
the 2005 Songhua River benzene spill. However, the extent to which this disaster posed
to be a crisis could have been avoided. The behaviors of local officials to hide the
benzene threat contributed the most to the panic and the perception that the government
was not in control. If word had been given out soon, local and central authorities would
have had more time to ship water to Harbin, dig more wells, and protect the communities
that were located between the site of the chemical plant explosion and Harbin. In their
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effort to control the situation, authorities ended up doing the exact opposite with a heavy
political cost.

2015 Tianjin Warehouse Explosions

The 2015 Tianjin warehouse explosions continue to show the cost of local
misgovernance event 10 years after the 2005 Songhua River benzene spill. Within Boin’s
framework, the 2015 Tianjin warehouse explosions case exhibits all three criteria: threat,
urgency, and uncertainty. The blasts occurred in a major port city less than an hour away
by train from Beijing. The threat of the damage the explosions and the ensuing fires could
cause was of great concern to the government. Over 15 million people live in Tianjin and
the blasts occurred less than one kilometer away from the nearest residential area, a
distance not in compliance with existing industrial regulations.243 As such, the urgency to
contain the flames and evacuate those near the blast site was also an immediate concern.
Adding to the fire danger was the lack of information about the nature of the blasts in the
first place. The government was unsure of the nature of the chemicals that had ignited
and of the toxic fumes that were spreading around the blast site. Different chemicals
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require different responses and authorities needed to figure out the appropriate measures
to take, especially in regards to guaranteeing the safety of the firefighters sent to combat
the flames.
In a general sense, the Tianjin blasts are a part of a greater problem; Beijing’s
ability to protect the health of its citizens while it encourages economic growth, enforce
environmental and safety regulations on the local level, and cut down on industrial and
economic related corruption. As mentioned earlier, a rising middle class has a greater
interest in their general health and wellbeing. This demand will pressure and incentivize
the government to both enact more regulations and enforce the ones in place. China has
had mixed results with the latter. This “enforcement gap,” described as the difference
between the regulations and laws in place and their actual compliance or enforcement,
has many different possible reasons. Most popular are the ideas that local governments
might not have an interest in compliance and thus do not enforce regulations, that the
perception of enforcement being difficult decreases efforts, and that enforcement
agencies simply are mismanaged or lack the resources to carry out their jobs, which
themselves are not always clearly defined. One case study of the enforcement gap in
Guangzhou came to the conclusion that local government support was not the limiting
factor, but rather poor coordination and perceived difficulty with enforcement.244 In
addition, widespread corruption throughout China’s economy poses another problem. In
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this case, the chemical warehouses that caused the Tianjin explosions were located less
than the mandatory one kilometer distance from residential areas – which in this case
included two hospitals, a convention center, and apartments.245 The follow up
investigation eventually charged Ruihai Logistics Company managers that owned the
chemical warehouses and 25 local officials who accepted bribes to waive the relevant
industrial regulations and municipal zoning rules.246 Similar circumstances are present all
over the country.
The Tianjin warehouse explosions and the subsidiary explosions continued for
almost two days. The initial two blasts went off at 11:20 PM on Wednesday, August 12.
The Tianjin government then reported around 2:30 PM on Thursday, August 13, that the
majority of the fire was under control.247 However, state media continued to report
numerous explosions on Friday, August 14. According to Xinhua, Tianjin’s fire
department head announced early Friday morning that firefighters, “are still battling the
raging fire.”248 Over 6,000 residents have been evacuated to temporary emergency
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shelters, such as Taida Second Primary school.249 More than 1,000 firefighters and 140
fire engines were dispatched to Tianjin. The fires were not put out until 42 hours after the
first blast.250 The military also sent troops to assist with the recovery and cleanup of the
toxic chemicals. The day after the blasts, more than 200 military nuclear and chemical
specialists arrived at Tianjin with detecting equipment to identify the chemical
compounds that had been exposed.251 Concerns over exposure to dangerous chemicals at
the site proved to be true. More than 700 tons of sodium cyanide, a white powder that is
fatal if inhaled, were found east of the detonation center and had to be handled by special
military units on August 16. As a precaution, the authorities also evacuated residents
within a three kilometer radius of the blast zone due to fears that wind might carry toxic
chemicals towards residential areas.252 Similar to other crises, Beijing sent a State
Councilor to Tianjin. Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong visited blast victims Thursday
night, wished them a speedy recovery, and held a meeting with the Tianjin authorities.
Vice Premier Liu was accompanied by Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun, who
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was in charge of a working group to respond to the crisis, and head of the National Health
and Family Planning Commission Li Bin. However, it was only on Sunday, August 16,
that Premier Li visited the city. Vice Premier Liu, while on the State Council and in the
Politburo, was not on the Politburo Standing Committee.253 By then, the urgency of the
crisis had ended as the authorities began implementing cleanup procedures.
The 2015 Tianjin warehouse explosions was an accidental industrial disaster that
eventually led to the loss of 173 lives and almost 800 injured.254 Of those lost, 115 were
firefighters or police officers. It was the deadliest industrial disaster since the Shaanxi
mine collapse in 2008.255 The government response to Tianjin is notable due to the postcrisis chemical clean up, the delay in sending Premier Li to the city, the clampdown on
critical social media, and the indictments of businesspeople and officials for the accident.
Although Tianjin officials promised to clean up the chemical spillage due to the blasts,
there were still pools of chemicals more than one year later. The delay in sending Premier
Li to Tianjin, which is a short train ride away, was also telling on the government’s part.
The response to crucial posts on social media – shutting them down – was also a
particularly heavy-handed approach. Lastly, the investigation and following trial was a
flashy display of justice. As one of the most recent large disasters in recent years, the
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Chinese government response to the Tianjin explosions shows the problems Beijing
needs to address and the solutions it’s come up with.
The ugly side to China’s miraculous economic growth in the past few decades is
the country’s high propensity towards being afflicted by industrial disasters. Such quick
growth left environmental and industrial regulations behind, to the detriment of Chinese
citizens. Industrial disasters continue to strike today, though not always as nearly bad as
the benzene spill or Tianjin warehouse explosions. In April 2017, inspectors found that
more than 470,000 tons of untreated sewage was intentionally released into Guangdong’s
waterways. This occured even after the city has spent $4.4 billion in the past four years to
improve its water quality.256 The visibility of industrial waste has become increasingly
visible to the Chinese public, particularly to the middle class. The daily blanketing grey
smog of pollution and the contaminated river ways that were once the source of China’s
civilization are too massive for the CCP to hide. The problem of industrial disasters is
linked to the inadequacy of regulation, enforcement, and the deep roots of corruption
found within the Chinese system. It is the most visible result of a system without clear
accountability.
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Conclusion

In each of these case studies, the Chinese government displayed similar patterns
and behaviors when responding to the crises. As shown in the 2008 Wenchuan
earthquake, the government is able to mobilize vast state resources and seeks to prevent
an image crisis through compassionate performance and repression. The CCP holds a
monopoly on power and this seems to be beneficial toward the party’s ability to
coordinate responses to crises and disasters in general. However, it seems that the Party is
continuously fighting a battle to maintain its performance-based image as the legitimate
authority in China, which is threatened every time a disaster turns into a crisis.
The mass mobilization of state resources plays to the CCP’s advantage when
addressing disasters. As seen in the government responses to the 2008 Wenchuan
earthquake, the 2008 winter storms, and the 2016 floods, Beijing is able to mobilize large
amounts of personnel, gather and distribute needed physical resources, exert economic
authority, and dedicate vast sums towards relief and reconstruction. For the 2008
earthquake, Beijing was able to call upon 148,000 PLA, PAP, and militia personnel to
respond to the disaster. When the 2008 winter storms struck, over 300,000 PLA troops
and more than 1 million reservists were mobilized to provide snow relief. Beijing ordered
at least 32,000 PAP members and an additional number of PLA units to respond to the
2016 floods. The Party’s structural control over China’s security services allows it to
have an institutional advantage to mobilizing security personnel for disaster relief. In
each disaster, PLA and other security personnel were generally sent to the crisis zones
within hours of each disaster starting. For example, in the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
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over 6,000 PLA troops in the Chengdu Military Region were sent to respond to the quake
in two hours. A few hundred specialist personnel were flown in from Beijing the same
day. The central government thus has the enormous capacity in which to send these
personnel to where they are needed by having the authority to mobilize any and all
resources needed. This ability is, however, limited by the capability and infrastructure of
the armed forces to mobilize vast amounts of troops. However, the numbers are still quite
high. One report assessing China’s armed forces mobilization puts the throughput
capacity of the military for the Wenchuan earthquake at 206,769 troops per day and for
the 2008 winter storms 554,444 troops per day.257 Throughput capacity is the total
number of troops mobilized for relief operations divided by the average time those troops
arrive at their destination. In essence, throughput capacity measures how fast the military
can effectively call up personnel, assign them, and get them to where they needed to be.
Therefore, the Chinese government was able to utilize over half a million security
personnel every day, not including almost one million police officers, while responding
to the 2008 winter storms.258 The subordinate position the military has towards the Party
and central government has allowed mobilizations of such a large magnitude to take
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place whenever a disaster occurs. In addition, the Party, with over 86 million members, is
able to bureaucratically mobilize needed personnel. The biggest example of this
occurring was in the aftermath of the 2008 earthquake, when significant amounts of local
administrative and party officials were incapacitated and not able to carry out their
regular responsibilities. To make up for the deficit caused by the disaster, the CCP flew
in officials from other regions. This dual mobilization, of first responders and
administrators, has allowed the CCP to effectively respond to disasters in force.
Parallel to the ability to mobilize personnel is Beijing’s capacity to gather and
distributed physical resources. For the 2005 benzene spill, the 2008 earthquake, the 2008
winter storms, and the 2016 floods, the government made pledges to quickly provide
material assistance and mobilized to do so. In response to the water supply crisis of the
2005 benzene spill in Harbin, the Harbin authorities shipped in at least 16,000 tons of
bottled water to make up for closing the city’s water supply system.259 Although citizens
complained, the logistical feat was impressive and the panic in the city did die down.
Vast amounts of material resources on a large scale were collected and distributed in all
of the cases studied, besides the 2015 Tianjin warehouse explosions. But even for the
warehouse explosions, around 6,000 people were provided with ad hoc relief in a school.
Adding to the capacity for the central and local governments to mobilize resources are
also the ultimate authority the Party has in controlling the economy. When the 2008

259. “Toxic Water of Polluted River Reaches Harbin,” China Daily, accessed
April 15, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/200511/24/content_497399.htm.

92

winter storms struck, there was a dearth of electricity and energy in the afflicted regions.
The central government in response made energy supply the key goal of their efforts and
instructed a national reduction of power and diverted electricity to the troubled areas.
When food prices began rising in afflicted provinces that had low food supplies due to
either poor transportation due to the storms or extremely cold weather conditions, the
local governments independently took efforts to impose price ceilings and ship food to
the needed areas. At one point, Wuhan officials allowed trucks carrying vegetable to
waive toll fees and gave over 100,000 low-income families a one-time subsidy to offset
the rising food prices.260 In a similar fashion, after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake,
Beijing ordered tent factories to produce big tents solely for disaster relief. In both
situations, the authority government officials have over the economy and transportation
allowed them to take drastic and immediate action. This even extended to the realm of
technology, with local governments regularly partnering with telecommunications
companies to send out emergency information through text messages. During the 2008
winter storms, the government sent out a total of 357 million text messages to the
public.261 Lastly, the central government earmarked significant funds towards recovery
and relief in the aftermath of each disaster. Usually, Beijing allocates funds based on
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province. As the 2016 floods subsided for example, the central government specifically
gave the hard-hit Hebei Province $37.4 million for recovery efforts.262 On a larger scale,
the partner support created in the aftermath of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake paired
counties within Sichuan Province with provinces around China. Wealthier provinces such
as Guangdong were instructed to provide economic relief to the counties damaged most
by the earthquake. This ingenious scheme, while very hierarchical and authoritarian,
forced the supporting provinces or municipalities to donate one percent of their local
financial revenue towards disaster recovery work in their respective counties.263 The
centralization of power grants Beijing extensive leeway over disaster response
coordination in terms of mobilization, economic behavior, and political policy. However,
as discussed later, this does come with some risks, mainly that criticism over disaster
management is aimed straight at the government.
The case studies also revealed a cognizant effort on part by the Chinese
government to avert image crises. Mentioned earlier in the chapter on the 2008
Wenchuan earthquake, image crises occur when an accused party is held responsible for
an offensive action. In regards to disasters, Beijing regularly seems to undergo situations
that might become, or contain elements of image crises. For example, in the 2008
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263.“Report on the 2008 Great Sichuan Earthquake,” International Recovery
Platform, accessed November 28, 2016,
http://www.recoveryplatform.org/resources/publications/199/report_on_the_2008_great_
sichuan_earthquake, 6.
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Wenchuan earthquake the CCP had to deal with two successive image crises. The first
was negative international attention over how China handled the 2008 Tibetan protests.
The prohibition of foreign media in Tibet led to international press relying on antiBeijing information from Tibetan exiles. The successive image crisis was mainly
domestic, and thus necessitated a more compressive response than the Tibetan-related
image crisis. This was the image crisis over the shoddy construction of hundreds of
school buildings that collapsed when the Wenchuan earthquake struck, killing thousands
of children and teachers. In response to this second, potentially more damaging image
crisis since it focused domestic criticism on the government, Beijing took several steps to
prevent the image crisis from developing. This ended up including the targeting of critics,
jail time for activists, online censorship, judicial obstruction and the enactment of
restrictive measures to prevent protests and gatherings over the collapsed school
buildings in an effort to prevent criticism, and responsibility for the collapses, from
hurting the government image. The experiences and trials of activists Huang Qi, Tan
Zuoren, and Ai Weiwei showed that the CCP was not afraid to use its usual toolbox of
repression to stamp out criticism and carry out image restoration. Huang was sentenced to
three years in prison and denied parole for “possessing state secrets.”264 Tan Zuoren had a
closed trial that lasted less than five minutes and ended up with him in jail for five

264.“China: End Quake Zone Abuses,” Human Rights Watch, May 6, 2009,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/06/china-end-quake-zone-abuses.
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years.265 Ai Weiwei was ambushed and beaten in his hotel by government security forces
while on his way to advocate for Tan.266 Repression was also conducted online. State
media began criticizing investigative articles of the collapsed school buildings after Zhou
Youkang urged local officials to “maintain social stability.”267 After the 2015 Tianjin
blasts, government censors punished 50 websites and over 300 social media accounts for
“spreading rumors.”268 Any threats to the government’s image and response were taken
seriously by Beijing.
Yet, the CCP also takes deliberately proactive, and to an extent pre-emptive,
behavior to avert image crises. These lines of behavior would include emotionallycharged rituals, sympathetic public statements, positive disaster response reporting, and
publicizing the care and remorse high ranking public officials have towards the crisis.
Such action manifested itself most clearly in the aftermath of the 2008 Wenchuan

265. Jiang Shao, “Police Bar Public from Attending Trial of Earthquake
Investigator Tan Zuoren,” Amnesty International UK, accessed November 26, 2016,
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Response and State–Society Relations,” The China Journal 71 (January 1, 2014): 105,
doi:10.1086/674555.
268.Benjamin Haas, “China’s Disaster Playbook Falls Short in Tianjin Blasts,”
Hong Kong Free Press, August 18, 2015,
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earthquake, with a display of compassionate moral performance. First, the CCP
leadership was depicted in such a way as to present the Party’s true sympathy for the
disaster victims. Premier Wen went to the earthquake struck areas the night of the seismic
event and was pictured walking around damaged areas offering his support and sympathy
for those affected. His cultivated image as “Grandpa Wen Jiabao” defined the state’s
remorse and sincerity towards responding to the crisis, pre-empting claims of central
government obliviousness or cold-heartedness. Similar visits by high ranking officials
had occurred previously in the 2008 winter storms a few months before, but were not as
emotionally-charged or sympathetic as Premier Wen’s image after the Wenchuan
earthquake. When the 2016 floods occurred, Premier Li took a 30-hour tour of the area
with a similar message of hope and solidarity.269 However, his performance was not as
memorable or emotionally sincere as his predecessor’s. Second was the practice of
rituals, which when performed and displayed properly emphasized the heartfelt sympathy
high ranking officials felt towards the disaster victims. National mourning periods and
the dissemination of images of the Politburo standing in silence at Zhongnanhai were
engineered to substantiate the compassionate and paternalistic image of the state. This
sort of ritual worked very well for such high-profile disasters such as the Wenchuan
earthquake, which as a singular destructive event could be depicted as humbling for the
leadership. Lastly, this perception spilled over into the image displays of the

269. “China Flooding Leaves Scores Dead and Missing,” CBS News, accessed
April 7, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-flooding-leaves-scores-dead-andmissing/.
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government’s emergency response on a personal level. Pictures of soldiers clearing roads,
police officers directing travelers, and exhausted rescue personnel sleeping on elevators
garnered a sense of sympathy for the first responders, who were an extension of the state
apparatus itself. Articles about old PLA officers slugging it out and emergency workers
helping strangers, such as Jiang Xuaojuan, the breast feeding police officer, remade the
disaster as a human, yet Chinese struggle. These narratives served to deflect criticism and
fill the disaster discourse with sympathetic memes and stories. Image crises occur based
on the perception, real or imaginary, of offensive actions or behaviors. By filling up state
media and disaster discourse with such imagery, the CCP could hope to marginalize the
perception of a failed or faulty response. This attempt even extended to foreign media,
where whether by design or not, international journalists had unprecedented access to the
Sichuan disaster areas. The openness of the press, or relative openness compared to the
restrictive measure imposed earlier in Tibet, contributed to foreign media praising the
CCP for how it handled the earthquake. In a pessimistic sense, this was a subtle
manipulative way for the CCP to gain good press and boost Beijing’s image among
domestic and international audiences.
In addition to the government’s capacity to address disasters in a sufficient
manner and Beijing’s ability to either evert or contain image crises, the vulnerable factor
that warps disasters into crises is actually more subtle. In each case studied, there were
public complaints over pre-disaster measures. For the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, it was
outcry over construction companies building school campuses that were not in
compliance with earthquake safety standards. For the 2008 winter storms, the affected
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public was angry over “a lack of preparedness” as one relief volunteer put it.270 Prior to
the weather storms becoming unusually intense, officials thought it would end in a few
days and the initial response made it seem as if the government was completely
unprepared, especially since the storms occurred during Chunyun, the mass migration
before the Spring Festival. Cities experienced losses of power while thousands of
travelers were stranded. When the 2016 June and July flooding took place, citizens in
several heavily afflicted areas expressed anger towards local officials for not warning
them in advance. The most infamous of these was the situation at the town of Xingtai in
Hebei. As the floods occurred, a local Party secretary remarked, to residents’
astonishment, on television that there had been “no casualties,” as a video of that
particular secretary kneeling before families that had lost loved ones circulated on social
media.271 According to some Xingtai residents, the town chief gave warning of the floods
while they began forming, leaving no time for them to respond appropriately.272 The
2005 Songhua River benzene spill was a crisis directly caused by government
mismanagement and failure to coordinate, to the extent that the spillover affected
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Russia’s preparations for the incoming benzene spill. Lastly, the 2015 Tianjin blasts took
place in a chemical warehouse that was closer to residential areas than allowed by zoning
rules in the city. Many blamed lax regulations and corruption for allowing such
dangerous sites to be located so closely to housing areas. Dissected individually, each
outcry is a local one, either due to provincial government mismanagement or corrupt
practices. However, taken together these situations point towards an underlying factor
that will continually hinder Beijing’s ability to effective deal with natural and industrial
disasters. This factor is the political system itself, which is one without accountability
that will repeat the vulnerabilities exhibited in each of these cases that have allowed them
all to become crises. Enforcement of regulations could have prevented hundreds of
school buildings from collapsing in 2008 and a chemical warehouse from exploding in
2015 with a force so strong it registered as a 2.9 earthquake on the Richter scale. Officials
could prepared for weeks of snow storms or flooding, two natural events that are not
unique to China, if they were motivated to serve their citizens rather than their own
pockets. Clear communication and accountability between authorities could have
prevented the panic that became the benzene spill crisis. These situations happen, but the
scope of the damage is exacerbated by the conditions in which these disasters take place
in. An authoritarian one party regime held accountable to none, reliant on repression and
growth based performance legitimacy, fearful of independent civil society, and made up
of millions of members more motivated by personal advancement than public service will
inherently stumble through each disaster if these base conditions do not change. The lack
of transparency, the prevalence of corruption, the deprivation of independent
investigative media, the normality of weak regulatory enforcement, and the absence of
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bottom-up accountability impede any real movement by China towards a state of affairs
in which natural and industrial disasters do not become crises. These disaster are not all
even crises by and of themselves, but become ones due to the inherently faulty nature of a
system that impedes its own improvement.
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Appendix

国家减灾委、民政部发布近期全国雪灾情况通报
时间：2008-01-23 14:43
1 月 10 日以来雪灾分省受灾情况
省份 受灾人
口

死亡人 紧急转移安

农作物

倒塌房

损坏房

直接经济

口

受灾面

屋

屋

损失

置人口

积

万人

人

万人

千公顷

万间

万间

亿元

湖北 780

5

7.2

481.3

1.1

3.3

14.3

安徽 300.9

1

0.4

150.9

0.3

2.2

4.3

湖南 636.4

——

7.7

300

0.47

2

8.3

重庆 184

——

0.2

——

0.22

0.45

0.54

四川 63

——

——

9.7

0.0097

0.09

0.7

贵州 474.7

——

——

91.7

0.023

0.27

2.17

河南 2.6

——

0.0025

1.8

0.007

0.0042

0.15
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陕西 42.3

——

——

1.1

0.0243

0.146

0.68

新疆 2.9

——

——

——

0.0049

0.1

0.05

合计 2487.0

6

15.5

1036.6

2.2

8.5

31.1

“国家减灾委、民政部发布近期全国雪灾情况通报-中华人民共和国民政部,” 中华人
民共和国中央人民政府, accessed February 12, 2017,
http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/mzyw/200801/20080110010490.shtml.
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